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Greater openness has become an almost universal feature of modern, developed economies. 
This paper develops a workhorse international model, and explores the role of standard 
monetary policy rules applied to an open economy. For this purpose, I build a two-country 
DSGE model with monopolistic competition, sticky prices, and pricing-to-market. I also 
derive the steady state and a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions. The 
paper provides a lengthy explanation of the steps required to derive this benchmark model, 
and a discussion of: (a) how to account for certain well-known anomalies in the international 
literature, and (b) how to start ‘thinking’ about monetary policy in this environment. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A milestone in the international business cycle literature came with the work of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992, 1994, 1995). The new open economy macro literature (NOEM) was launched by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995, 2002) shortly after that1. It can be argued that its precursors go back at least to Svensson and
van Wijnbergen (1989), who worked out a model with NOEM features as an open economy development of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). The recent treatise on the theory of monetary policy by Woodford (2003)
is a common reference point for the NOEM literature too, even if it is concerned primarily with closed
economies. Woodford (2003) has formalized the modern view that monetary policy is relevant even in a
cashless economy.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the benchmark NOEM model and to discuss the role for
monetary policy in it. I study the neoclassical synthesis which incorporates commonly-used frictions in the
literature (i.e., monopolistic competition, staggered prices and pricing-to-market) into an otherwise simpliﬁed
version of the standard two-country international business cycle model. The analysis is conducted largely on
theoretical grounds. The analysis is framed around a number of stylized facts that are thought to be robust
in major industrialized countries for the post-Bretton Woods period and characteristic of open economies
(see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000). The paper also emphasizes diﬀerences with the frictionless models.
The Concept of Openness. Globalization in its most basic meaning is just openness to trade (whether
in goods, inputs or assets). The NOEM literature, therefore, concerns itself with the eﬀects that openness
has on the domestic economy. As we go along, I will try to make this point as clear as possible. But, how
do we quantify the eﬀects of globalization anyway?
First, the magnitude and eﬀects of openness cannot be unequivocally determined by the volumes of
trade. It is possible to write models in which countries are fully open to trade (without frictions) and yet
optimally decide not to exchange anything. We cannot infer from the lack of trade that the economies are
closed. Most importantly, we cannot infer that openness is irrelevant. Let me give a simple example for
illustrative purposes. Suppose that production of a certain variety is controlled by a domestic monopolist.
The local government decides to eliminate all trade barriers and foreign competitors begin to challenge the
incumbent domestic monopolist. It is possible to end up in a new equilibrium where the incumbent defeats
the challengers by aggressively changing their pricing policy. Trade does not occur, and yet the impact of
greater openness on prices can be quite signiﬁcative.
1As Galí and Gertler (2007) note, "Goodfriend and King employ the term ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’, while Woodford
uses ‘NeoWicksellian’. At the insistence of a referee, in our (Galí and Gertler’s) 1999 paper with Richard Clarida, we used ‘New
Keynesian’. The latter term has probably become the most popular, though it does not adequately reﬂect the inﬂuence of real
business cycle theory".
1Second, openness is a relative concept best deﬁned in opposition to the closed economy equilibrium. Its
eﬀects, however, are conditional on a certain characterization of the model economy. The trade volumes
are endogenously determined, and depend on the market structure, but also on other features of the model
(preferences, technologies, taxes, trading costs, etc.). Hence, a decline in trade volumes alone cannot be
shown as proof of decreasing openness or argued as evidence of greater insulation from foreign shocks.
Third, there is no guarantee that monetary policy is welfare-enhancing or that monetary policy is more
or less ‘eﬀective’ with greater openness. It is always possible to write a frictionless model where money is
neutral. Hence, in that environment no monetary policy rule is welfare-enhancing whether the economy is
open or closed, because money itself has no real eﬀects. Whether monetary policy is welfare-enhancing crit-
ically depends on the market structure preventing an optimal allocation from occurring naturally. Nominal
rigidities or other frictions are necessary to make sense of monetary policy.
How to conduct monetary policy optimally in an open economy is still an open question, but the answer
very much hinges upon the set of frictions that one assumes. The benchmark NOEM model posits a market
structure characterized by costless and instantaneous trading in goods markets2, complete asset markets,
and fully segregated markets for inputs (particularly, labor). Openness operates fundamentally on the goods
market and the asset markets, while frictions on both markets are expected to account for a number of
stylized facts and puzzles. The literature emphasizes the importance of pricing decisions, and has developed
a framework to do so based on nominal rigidities, monopolistic competition and the eﬀects of local-currency
pricing (henceforth, LCP) and producer-currency pricing (henceforth, PCP). It has also given much attention
to the role of monetary policy on the demand-side.
In summary, the increased mobility and interdependence of the world’s ﬁnancial and goods markets,
may be due to improvements of the information technology, the reduction in government barriers to doing
business internationally, preference changes, ﬁnancial innovations, etc. The interest on globalization driven
by a trend for increased trade across countries may decay in the future if these patterns reverse themselves,
even though these evolution may have little to do with market openness per se. But openness, or lack thereof,
is a topic that has accompanied mankind since the dawn of time and it will continue to preoccupy scholars
long after this paper has come out of fashion. Naturally, the only thing left to do is to devote ourselves
to the subject as best as we can given the tools at our disposal in hopes that our eﬀorts will enhance our
general understanding of economics.
2 The Six Fundamental Puzzles in International Macroeconomics
At a basic level, I attempt to model and understand the basic primitives of an economy. The model of
reference is the frictionless international real business cycle model (or a simpliﬁed version of it), while
the benchmark for the NOEM literature adds some key frictions (nominal rigidities, pricing-to-market and
monopolistic competition). I also discuss the role of frictions in the asset markets. The ultimate goal is to
obtain a uniﬁed framework that captures a number of relevant stylized facts of the external sector. Having
a uniﬁed framework gives us a null hypothesis to think about issues of international macroeconomics and
ﬁnance with a point of reference. Parsimony is always preferred in modelling.
2See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) for a discussion of the role that costly international trading can play.
2The stylized facts that inform my discussion, at least partially, are summarized in the form of six puzzles.
These six puzzles come with the seal of approval of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a). The six puzzles, which I
brieﬂy describe here, are viewed as tell-tale signs of modelling failures which require deeper thought. The
six stylized facts described by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a) are:
◦ The Home Bias in Trade Puzzle. The evidence in McCallum (1995) and Evans (2003) suggests that
trade within a country is substantially greater than across the border and, therefore, international goods
markets appear to be quite segmented. The main focus of this paper is the international ﬁnance puzzles.
However, it is worth noticing that there are other related real trade puzzles. For example, Treﬂer’s (1995)
‘missing trade’ puzzle arising because the imputed factor content of trade does not seem to reﬂect comparative
advantage, or the empirical failure of the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of factor-price equalization. The home
bias in trade should be viewed as part of this larger set of trade anomalies.
◦ The Savings-Investment (or Feldstein-Horioka) Puzzle. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) demonstrate
that long period averages of national savings rates are highly correlated with the same averages of domestic
investment rates among OECD countries. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a) show that the correlations have
decreased over time, but they remain surprisingly higher than one might expect in a world with fully
integrated asset markets.
◦ The Home Bias in Equity Portfolios Puzzle. French and Poterba (1991) observe that investors
maintain a perplexing preference for home assets in spite of the rapid expansion of international asset
markets experienced over the past decades. Over time, portfolios have become more diversiﬁed. But the
pervasive eﬀects of the bias remain and have been documented across many (small and large) economies.
See Lewis (1999) for a detailed survey of the literature.
◦ The International Consumption Correlations Puzzle. The evidence on consumption growth correlations
is often hard to reconcile with the much higher correlations predicted in models with complete international
asset markets. Under complete asset markets, country-speciﬁc risks are easily pooled and shared across
countries making consumption growth less dependent on them. As noted by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a),
the consumption correlation puzzle is intimately connected to the Feldstein-Horioka and the home equity
bias puzzles: "Given that the most transparent of market means of consumption smoothing -debt and equity
trade- are far less operative across borders than within them, it should not come as any great surprise that
international consumption correlations are low".
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) note that, moreover, international output growth rates appear to be
more correlated than consumption. Backus and Smith (1993) show that ﬂuctuations in consumption ratios
and bilateral real exchange rates ought to be highly correlated whenever international asset markets are
complete, and yet there is little empirical evidence for this relationship in the data. Ultimately, consumption
correlation puzzles play a prominent role in distinguishing among alternative models, so the discussion often
revolves around them.
◦ The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle. Rogoﬀ (1996) explore the tenuous connection between nominal
exchange rates and consumption price indexes, resulting into highly volatile and persistent real exchange
rates3. The slow mean reversion of the real exchange rate, however, does not appear to depend on the
contribution of nontraded goods as documented most strikingly by Engel (1999) and Chari, Kehoe and
3As a note of caution, estimates of the persistence of the real exchange rates can be missleading. For example, in the presence
of transaction costs or other nonlinearities, the real exchange rate can move slowly within a band and more quickly outside of
it.
3McGrattan (2002).
There are also other stylized facts to keep in mind related to this puzzle. Goldberg and Knetter (1997)
survey the empirical literature and conclude that the pass-through of nominal exchange rates relative to
international prices is much faster at the importer level than at the consumer level. They also provide
evidence of pricing-to-market behavior (and price discrimination). Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000b) argue that
terms of trade worsen in response to an exchange rate depreciation. This fact, however, is hard to account
for with very sluggish import prices. The purchasing power parity (henceforth, PPP) puzzle is, therefore, a
broad reﬂection of the trouble that conventional general equilibrium models have to rationalize the observed
patterns of international pricing.
◦ T h eE x c h a n g eR a t eD i s c o n n e c tP u z z l e . This puzzle refers to the weak relationship found empirically
between the nominal exchange rate and most macro variables of interest, except for long horizons. Meese and
Rogoﬀ (1983) show that standard present-value models of the nominal exchange rate are regularly beaten
by a naive random walk whenever forecasting short- and medium-horizons. Baxter and Stockman (1989)
and Flood and Rose (1995) argue about the neutrality of the exchange rate regime based on the fact that
transitions to ﬂoating exchange rates tend to generate increases in nominal and real exchange rate volatility
without corresponding changes in the fundamentals. All these papers are manifestations of the same puzzle,
anyway. They point out the diﬃculties of explaining exchange rate dynamics in terms of macroeconomic
fundamentals as general equilibrium models attempt to do.
The power purchasing parity puzzle and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle (the so-called pricing puzzles)
focus our attention on the pricing behavior, including the dynamic covariation between prices and other macro
variables. However, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a) already indicate, these puzzles are also more prevalent
in the short- to medium-run, while all other puzzles (the so-called quantity puzzles) are more important in
the long-run. In this paper, let that be clear, I concentrate most of the discussion on the pricing puzzles.
3 The Workhorse Open Economy Macro Model
I specify a stochastic, two-country general equilibrium model in the spirit of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2002),
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), and Woodford (2007), among others. The
home country has a mass of n identical households, the foreign country (denoted with an asterisk) has a mass
of 1 − n identical households. There is also a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms located in
each country, which produce a diﬀerentiated, tradable good. Firms in the home country produce varieties in
the range [0,n], while foreign ﬁrms produce in the range (n,1]. The population size of each country matches
with the range of produced varieties. Hence, the number of ﬁrms in each country equals the number of
households.
Under complete asset markets, households in both countries have access to a full set of Arrow-Debreu
securities (or state-contingent bonds) which are quoted in both the domestic and foreign currencies. Under
incomplete asset markets, households in both countries have access to two uncontingent bonds (each quoted
in a diﬀerent currency). A frictionless goods market is modelled with ﬂexible prices and no trading costs.
Frictions in the goods market are introduced in the form of nominal price stickiness à la Calvo (1983) and
pricing-to-market. Deviations from PPP occur because nominal prices are sticky in the local currency of the
buyer, and ﬁrms can eﬀectively price discriminate across markets.
4Both countries are essentially symmetric, although shocks are not always perfectly correlated. I allow for
two important deviations from symmetry. I assume a home bias in consumption preferences (see Warnock,
2003), and I conjecture that the degree of price stickiness may vary depending on whether the ﬁrm is located
in one country or the other4.
3.1 Preliminary Concepts
The law of one price (henceforth, LOOP) states that barring frictional or complicating factors such as tariﬀs,
taxes, and transportation costs, the price of an internationally traded good in one country should be equal to
the identical price in another country, once the price is expressed in the same currency. Absolute purchasing
power parity (henceforth, absolute PPP) extends the concept to a common basket of goods. It simply states
that a basket of goods which are frictionlessly and instantaneously traded must have an identical price in
every country once the corresponding price index is expressed in the same currency.
If the basket of consumption goods contains some goods that are non-tradeable, some goods for which
trading costs are non-negligible or the composition of the basket diﬀers across countries, absolute PPP is
likely fail even if the LOOP holds for all (frictionlessly) tradable goods. It is quite common to compare the
CPI across countries expressed in the same currency with the help of the nominal exchange rate, and this
evidence suggests that absolute PPP fails. However, this is neither proof that the LOOP fails nor a proper
comparison because CPI baskets are not homogeneous across countries and often contain goods that are not
internationally traded5.
Relative Purchasing Power Parity (henceforth, relative PPP) states that a basket of goods must have
the same aggregate price in each pair of countries, if the price indexes are expressed in the same currency,
up to a constant. Absolute PPP can be viewed as a special case of relative PPP. The LOOP may fail to
hold because there is only limited pass-through. But if the pass-through rate is constant and identical for all
goods, then the aggregation over all goods displays a similar pattern. Diﬀerences in prices may also be due
to distribution costs or mark-ups that are country speciﬁc, if they exhibit little time variation. Furthermore,
as noted before, pricing diﬀerences across CPIs could also be due to trading costs and compositional eﬀects.
Systematic diﬀerences in those components of the observable price can explain the failure of absolute
P P P .H o w e v e r ,i ft h o s ed i ﬀerences are constant over time, then relative PPP should still hold.
Fluctuations of the Real Exchange Rate under the LOOP. T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e ,RSt,c a nb e
computed as the nominal exchange rate, St, times the ratio of the CPI in the foreign country, P∗
t ,o v e rt h e






If relative PPP holds, the real exchange rate should be equal to a constant, and equal to one if PPP is
absolute. The empirical evidence suggests that relative PPP fails (at least in the short- and medium-
horizons), so ﬂuctuations of the real exchange rate are very volatile and persistent. Not surprisingly, the
4For other types of asymmetry in the degree of price rigidity, see G. Benigno (2004) and Martínez-García (2007).
5In this paper, I abstract from nontraded goods entirely. However, I shall explore deviations from absolute PPP due to
diﬀerences in the underlying basket of consumption goods across countries.
5interpretation of these real exchange rate ﬂuctuations has become one of the most relevant topics in the
international macro literature these days.
A number of researchers emphasize the presence of nominal rigidities and local-currency pricing in the
goods market as an explanation for the failure of the LOOP6, based on the existing evidence that suggests
most goods adjust their prices infrequently while changes in the nominal exchange rate occur almost contin-
ually. However, the failure of the LOOP is not required to induce ﬂuctuations on the real exchange rate and
violations of PPP. For simplicity, let me assume that prices are fully ﬂexible, then the following alternative
explanations exist,
Compositional Diﬀerences. Warnock’s (2003) model of consumption bias in preferences gives me a natural
candidate. I can use the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate and the CPIs implied by the workhorse model,




























































t . Hence, it is possible

















Absolute and relative PPP fail in this setting, even if the LOOP holds, except in the case where the terms
of trade endogenously turn out to be time-invariant or preferences are identical across countries. In the
long-run, however, it is likely to ﬁnd support for relative PPP assuming that the real exchange rate and the
terms of trade converge towards a deterministic steady state.
Trading Costs. Let me assume ‘iceberg’ shipping costs as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a) such that for
every unit of home and foreign good shipped abroad, only a fraction 1 − τc arrives at destination. These
trading costs are identical for all varieties and across countries. I denote PH
t and PF
t the domestic price of
the home and foreign goods, while PH∗
t and PF∗
t denote the corresponding foreign prices. Then, if markets










t =( 1 − τc)StPH∗
t .
6I follow the same logic in these notes. However, as noted in my prior observations, ﬂuctuations of the real exchange rate
may occur even if the LOOP holds. This point is of great importance because it aﬀects how we think about monetary monetary
policy. If nominal rigidities are the primary channel, then optimal monetary policy may have real eﬀe c t sa n dar o l et op l a y
in response to relative price distortions. If the LOOP holds and the real exchange rate ﬂuctuates purely due to compositional
eﬀects in the basket of goods or trading costs, optimal monetary policy has no real eﬀects in the model.
6For any 0 ≤ τc < 1, I can use again the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate and the CPI indexes implied by








































































Again, absolute and relative PPP fail in this setting even though the LOOP holds. However, relative PPP
(but not absolute PPP) is a possible outcome if terms of trade are time invariant or preferences are identical
across countries. This is no longer true if I assume that the trading costs are either time-varying or diﬀerent
across varieties and countries.
Non-traded Goods. Non-traded varieties can be viewed as a special case where the ‘iceberg’ shipping
costs are equal to one, i.e. τc =1 . Therefore, prices abroad for domestic non-traded varieties are always
inﬁnity and demand for them is zero. A similar statemen tc a nb em a d er e g a r d i n gt h ed o m e s t i cp r i c e so f




t the domestic price of the traded and non-traded
home goods, and P
F,T




















t =( 1 − τc)StP
H,T∗
t .
A simple and straightforward extension of the consumption price indexes in the workhorse model allows me
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denote the ratio of prices between non-traded and traded
quoted in the local currency for the domestic and foreign goods, respectively. In the case where the elasticity
of intratemporal substitution between the home and foreign bundles is one, i.e. σ =1 ,t h ee x p r e s s i o nf o r
































NT. Absolute and relative PPP fail in this
setting once again, even though the LOOP holds. However, not even relative PPP is a possibility except in
t h eu n l i k e l ye v e n tw h e r et e r m so ft r a d ea n dt h er a t i o so f non-traded to traded goods are all time invariant.
Even though ﬂuctuations can arise from any of these channels, the evidence shows that consumption-
based real exchange rates ﬂuctuate a lot over the short- to medium-horizon. Seemingly more than can be
accounted for with ﬂuctuations of the terms of trade, the trading costs or non-traded goods7. This has been
interpreted as concurring evidence that violations of the LOOP are necessary to explain important features
of the data. This has also supported a strong interest on nominal rigidities and other goods market frictions
(e.g., pricing-to-market) in the international macro literature. I build on this idea too.
3.2 The Households’ Problem
For tractability, I abstract from a number of relevant features like capital and investment (see, e.g., Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan, 2002, or Martínez-García and Sondergaard, 2008) and durable goods (see, e.g., Engel
and Wang, 2007). All consumption is in terms of perishable consumption goods. The lifetime utility for
the representative household in the home country is additively separable in aggregate consumption, Ct,r e a l
7Trading costs are thought to be slow-moving and more relevant for the long-run horizon. See Engel (1999) and Chari,




Pt , and labor supply, Ls

























where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective intertemporal discount factor8. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, the risk aversion on real balances, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
satisfy that γ>0( γ 6=1 ) , ζ>0( ζ 6=1 )and ϕ>0, respectively. The coeﬃcients χ and κ are nonnegative.




























Hence, the lifetime utility is symmetric in both countries.
The Budget Constraints. In each period t the world economy confronts one of inﬁnitely many events
ωt ∈ Ω in the state space Ω. The initial realization ω0 is given, ht denotes the history of events up to
time t,a n dμ(ωt+1 | ht) ≡ μt (ωt+1) the conditional probability at time t. The representative household in
the home country allocates his wealth between three diﬀerent asset types: domestic currency, Md
t ;e i t h e ra
set of Arrow-Debreu securities or an uncontingent bond expressed in the domestic currency, BH
t (ωt+1) or
BH
t ; and, either a set of Arrow-Debreu securities or an uncontingent bond quoted in the foreign currency,
BF
t (ωt+1) or BF
t .
Similarly, the foreign household demands foreign currency, Md
t , a set of Arrow-Debreu securities or a
bond expressed in the domestic currency, BH∗
t (ωt+1) or BH∗
t , and a set of Arrow-Debreu securities or a
bond quoted in the foreign currency, BF∗
t (ωt+1) or BF∗
t . As a convention, the time subscript indicates the
period at which the security is issued and sold to the households. Also each household only holds money
issued in the local currency. Local money is issued exclusively by the local monetary authority, and assumed
to be a one-period liability on their balance sheet.
Complete Asset Markets. Arrow-Debreu securities (or claims) are modelled as one-period contingent
bonds in zero net-supply. At each period t they involve the promise to pay one unit of the local currency if
state ωt+1 occurs and 0 otherwise. The domestic-currency price of one unit of the domestic contingent bond
at time t is denoted Q(ωt+1 | ht) ≡ Qt (ωt+1), while the foreign-currency price of one unit of the foreign
contingent bond is Q∗ (ωt+1 | ht) ≡ Q∗
t (ωt+1). The continued existence of a full set of one-period Arrow-
Debreu securities suﬃces to complete the asset markets recursively. If this contingent bonds are available
in the asset markets and asset trading is otherwise frictionless, I say that the economy has ‘complete asset
markets’.
The domestic household maximizes its lifetime utility in (3.2.1) subject to the sequence of budget con-

















t + Πt − Tt,
(3.2.3)
where Wt is the domestic nominal wage, Pt is the domestic consumption price index or CPI, St is the
nominal exchange rate, Tt is the nominal lump-sum tax (or transfer) from the domestic government, and Πt
are nominal domestic proﬁts. Similarly, the foreign household maximizes its lifetime utility in (3.2.2) subject


























t is the foreign nominal wage, P∗
t is the foreign CPI, T∗
t is the nominal lump-sum tax (or transfer)
received from the foreign government, and Π∗
t are nominal foreign proﬁts.
I assume that there is no trade in either domestic or foreign shares. Moreover, I also impose a strict
home bias in portfolios by giving sole ownership of the local ﬁrms to the local households. For asset markets
to be complete it is not necessary to have each Arrow-Debreu claim quoted in both currencies. One of these
two claims is redundant. In fact, most models with complete asset markets only have securities quoted in
one of the currencies. However, having both of them is very convenient to compare the ‘complete’ versus
the ‘incomplete’ asset markets.
Incomplete Asset Markets. I still maintain that trading in assets is frictionless, but I assume instead that
households only have access to uncontingent bonds to deﬁne an alternative economy with ‘incomplete asset
markets’. That is, households can only invest their wealth in two bonds (each one of them quoted in a diﬀerent
currency). The domestic bond promises one unit of the domestic currency at time t +1(independently of
the event ωt+1) in exchange for Qt ≡ 1
1+it units of the domestic currency at time t. Similarly, the foreign
bond promises one unit of the foreign currency tomorrow in exchange for Q∗
t ≡ 1
1+i∗
t units of the foreign
currency today. The one-period riskless nominal interest rates in the domestic and foreign country are it
and i∗
t, respectively.
Given my description of the asset markets with two sets of Arrow-Debreu claims quoted in each currency,
it naturally follows that the incomplete asset market model with uncontingent bonds is equivalent to imposing











for all ωt+1 ∈ Ω. In other words, the demand for bonds is uncontingent because that’s the nature of the
assets traded. In this situation, the uncontingent bonds are not suﬃcient in general to complete the asset
markets (unless there are only two states of nature in each period, or the asset markets are irrelevant as
in Cole and Obstfeld, 1991, and Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001), and are not redundant. This structure is
particularly convenient because it makes easier to visualize the diﬀerence between complete and incomplete
asset markets.
The returns on the uncontingent bonds can be replicated with Arrow-Debreu claims. Therefore, the


























































This type of asset market structure is often referred to in the literature as a bond economy.Ic a nw r i t et h e










































t−1 (ωt) ≡ Md
t−1 + BH
t−1 (ωt) and AF∗
t−1 ≡ Md∗
t−1 + BF∗
t−1 (ωt) represent the total value of nominal
wealth in the local currency at the beginning of period t. The interest rate diﬀerential between a riskless,











It is evident from (3.2.8) − (3.2.9) that these terms measure the opportunity cost of holding part of one’s
wealth in monetary form.
Preference for Varieties and the Price Indexes. The home and foreign consumption bundles of the
domestic household, CH
t and CF























































ξξ(1−ξ)1−ξ , if σ =1 .
(3.2.11)
The elasticity of substitution across varieties produced within a country is θ>1, the elasticity of intratem-
poral substitution between the home and foreign bundles of varieties is σ>0, and the share of the home
11goods in the preference of the domestic consumer is ξ.T h e s u p e r s c r i p t s H and F refer to purchases of
goods produced in the home and foreign country, respectively. The lower case h and f indicate domestic
and foreign varieties, respectively.





























































(1−ξ∗)1−ξ∗ , if σ =1 .
(3.2.13)
Preferences are identical for households in both countries, except for the share of home and foreign goods
in the preference of each consumer. The parameter ξ
∗ denotes the share of domestic goods for the foreign
household. These deﬁnitions allow for home bias in consumption as in Warnock (2003). A convenient
simpliﬁcation is to assume that ξ = ξ
∗ = n.
T h ed o m e s t i cC P I ,Pt,i sd e ﬁned as the minimum expenditure needed to buy one unit of the consumption
index, Ct. Similarly for P∗
t and C∗
t . Under standard results on functional separability, the indexes which







































































































t are the price sub-indexes for the home- and foreign-produced bundles of goods in units
of the home currency. Similarly for PH∗
t and PF∗
t . Home and foreign households have identical tastes and,

















9Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2002) only explore the case where the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between the home
and foreign bundles of varieties is σ =1 . But preferences are not scaled and, therefore, the CPI must be pre-multiplied by k
nn (1 − n)1−n
l−1
.






where St denotes the nominal exchange rate.













T h er e l a t i v ee x c h a n g ep r i c e ,RPt, represents the value of imported goods (quoted in the domestic market)
relative to the value of the domestic good supplied locally. This ratio is the ‘local market’ cost of replacing one
unit of imports with one unit of the domestically-produced good. Instead, terms of trade ToTt represents
the value of imported goods (quoted in the domestic market) relative to the value of the domestic good
exported to the foreign market, but expressed in units of the local currency. This ratio measures the ‘foreign
market’ cost of replacing one unit of imports with one unit of exports. Similarly for RP∗
t and ToT∗
t .
The Demand Function for each Variety. Each household decides how much to allocate to the diﬀerent
varieties of home and foreign goods. Given the structure of preferences, the solution to the sub-utility










































t , if f ∈ (n,1], (3.2.22)





































These equations indicate that the domestic demand for each variety, whether domestic or foreign, is a function
of total domestic consumption. Similarly, the foreign demand for each variety, whether domestic or foreign,
is a function of total foreign consumption.
The First-Order Conditions of the Households’ Problem. Under complete asset markets, the (in-
terior) optimal allocation of consumption expenditures in each country over time and across states implies
10Terms of trade and relative prices are identical and the real exchange rate is equal to one only if the LOOP holds in
both countries. Since the LOOP condition fails in the workhorse model, ﬂuctuations of the real exchange rate arise and the



























which must hold for all ωt+1 ∈ Ω. These are the intertemporal conditions that characterize the optimal
allocation of resources, and perfect international risk-sharing. The combination of equations (3.2.25) −
(3.2.27) results in the following equilibrium condition expressed compactly (and, for ease of notation, without













where the real exchange rate is deﬁned in (3.2.19).

















is a constant that depends on the initial conditions11.T h i se q u a t i o ni sc e n t r a lt ot h e
so-called Backus-Smith Puzzle,a l s ok n o w na sthe real exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly,a n di sa t
t h ec o r eo fw h a tt h einternational consumption correlations puzzle is all about. The puzzle arises because
the complete asset markets model clearly ties the real exchange rate to the relative consumption, while the
empirical evidence suggests that the correlation between the two is weak and often negative. The choice of a
functional form for the preferences is obviously not trivial in this result. However, most of the literature has
argued that the empirical evidence is symptomatic of lack of international risk-sharing, and has concentrated
on theories of asset market incompleteness (or other frictions in asset trading) to seek an explanation.
Under incomplete asset markets, I obtain a conventional set of stochastic Euler equations,
1
1+it

































which is equivalent to taking conditional expectations on both sides of (3.2.25) − (3.2.27) and re-arranging
11In a symmetric world and after a convenient normalization of the steady state, which I discuss later, home and foreign
consumption are identical and the real interest rate is equal to one. Hence, if the initial conditions correspond to those of the
normalized steady state, the constant υ in the above expression is equal to one.




















It holds true that the IMRS and the price of the Arrow-Debreu securities are related as follows,










for all ωt+1 ∈ Ω. In other words, the price of an Arrow-Debreu claim can be interpreted as the product of
the IMRS at a given state of nature times the conditional probability of that event actually occurring. If
investors were risk-neutral, then they would be willing to buy insurance through Arrow-Debreu claims at a
cost equal to the conditional probability of each possible event. The IMRS, therefore, could be viewed as
the premium (or discount) that investors are ready to pay over the risk-neutral price of a claim in order to
be indiﬀerent between buying the claim and ‘tolerating the risk’.
Finally, the equilibrium conditions of the households’ problem also include a pair of stable money demand





































plus the appropriate no-Ponzi games, transversality conditions and the budget constraint of both represen-
tative households. Equations (3.2.36) − (3.2.39) are the intratemporal equilibrium conditions. The labor
supply and the money demand functions in this framework do not depend on the assumption of complete
asset markets. These ﬁrst-order conditions are the same whether households have access to a full set of
Arrow-Debreu securities or just a pair of one-period riskless bonds.
Balanced Growth: A Brief Comment. Let me abstract from all stochastic uncertainty, and from
monetary policy regime changes that would shift the opportunity cost of holding money. I require that in
the market sector the labor-augmenting productivity, gt, grows at an exogenous and constant net rate of g.
In other words, Ls
t (= Lt) units of time produce gtLt units of labor for production purposes. Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2002) assume that the non-market sectors grow at the same rate g.
Adapting their idea to the workhorse model implies that technical progress raises the eﬀort of time
allocated to market production, so that Ls
t (= Lt) units of time produce gtLt units of labor output as well as
gtLt units of labor disutility. In fact, technical progress raises the time allocated for transaction or liquidity












Given the speciﬁcation of preferences adopted in this paper, whenever consumption, Ct, and real balances,
Mt














ϕ (1 + g)
(1+ϕ)t (1 + g)
γt,
which follows naturally from the ﬁrst-order conditions in equations (3.2.36) and (3.2.38). Similarly for
the foreign country. Along the balanced growth path, real wages must grow at the same rate as gt,a n d
the opportunity cost of holding money should be constant (unless a policy regime change occurs). Hence,
ensuring a balanced growth in this model with additively separable utility functions requires that γ = −ϕ
and γ = ζ − z (1 − ζ). These parametric conditions are most often not satisﬁed in the literature (specially
the restriction on the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply13).
3.3 The Firms’ Problem
Each ﬁrm supplies the home and foreign markets. I impose competitive markets for inputs (labor), that
are fully segregated across countries. That is, cross-border labor migrations are not feasible. Frictions in
the goods market are modelled with nominal price stickiness à la Calvo (1983) and pricing-to-market14.
Firms set prices in the local currency (LCP pricing) and, consequently, invoice exports in the currency
of the importer. Furthermore, ﬁrms engage in third-degree price discrimination across markets and enjoy
monopolistic power in their own variety. Re-selling must be precluded so that the optimal pricing policy is
not reversed by re-sellers exploiting the arising arbitrage opportunities in the goods market.
These assumptions require a degree of international market segmentation which prevents the equalization
of prices across borders, and opens up an important channel for deviations from the LOOP (and, therefore,
from absolute PPP). This paper focuses on ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates arising solely from deviations
of the LOOP on traded goods or home bias in consumption (see Warnock, 2003). I abstract from non-traded
goods altogether to be consistent with the evidence documented by Engel (1999) and Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2002)15. I also sidestep distribution costs on tradable goods even though these assumption adds
12The utility function used by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) is not additively separable in real balances. However,
they make the sensible assumption that z =0 .





The parametric restriction for balanced growth path with this alternative utility is γ = ϕ. Balanced growth is easier to reconcile
with this restriction than the one used in the paper.
14I do not discuss state-dependent pricing in spite of its increasing relevance in the debate about international pricing. For
more details on state-dependent pricing, see Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) and Landry (2007). For details on the impact of
sticky information on the dynamics of inﬂation, see Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006).
15This evidence, however, is not undisputed. For instance, Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) use retail goods and services
prices between all EU countries to conclude that "good-by-good measures of cross-sectional price dispersion are negatively related
16a non-tradeable component to local prices that could explain the pricing diﬀerences across markets. I also
ignore the iceberg-type trading costs proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a).
The Technology. With probability α ∈ [0,1],a tt i m et the domestic ﬁrm producing variety h is forced
to maintain its previous period prices in the domestic and foreign markets16. With probability (1 − α),t h e
ﬁrm receives a signal to optimally reset each price. Firm h ∈ [0,n] produces a diﬀerentiated (and tradable)




where At is the domestic productivity shock. Analogously, the probability of re-setting prices for the foreign






t is the foreign productivity shock.
The labor force is homogenous within a country and immobile across borders, and the national labor
markets are perfectly competitive. Hence, wages equalize in each country but not necessarily across countries,
i.e. Wt (h)=Wt for all h ∈ [0,n], W∗
t (f)=W∗
t for all f ∈ (n,1], and usually Wt 6= W∗
t .O t h e r w i s e ,o n l y
the ﬁrms with the largest wages would be supplied in a competitive labor market. As a consequence, the
nominal cost function is multiplicatively separable in output and the nominal unit-cost is equal to the nominal

















where φt and φ
∗
t are a pair of taxes (or subsidies) charged by the ﬁscal authority in each country in order to
inﬂuence wage costs and the conditions in the labor market.
The Net Discounted Proﬁts. Households are charged a diﬀerent price in each country for the same
variety, but they still face a constant price within a country for all units of output purchased. Re-selling
across borders is either banned or infeasible due to high costs. A domestic ﬁrm h has to choose the price
charged domestically (in units of the domestic currency), e Pt (h), and the price charged abroad (in units of
the foreign currency), e P∗
t (h). The objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of its net proﬁts
to the tradeability of the good, and positively related to the share of non-traded inputs required to produce the good". They
also argue that their ﬁndings are supportive of a model where the retail goods sold to consumers include a signiﬁcative share
of non-traded input (which e.g. could be interpreted as distribution services).
16Under the Calvo speciﬁcation, the probability of setting a new price, 1 − α,i st h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms and is independent of
the time elapsed since the last price change. Hence, the average time under ﬁxed prices is equal to 1
1−α.
17I abstract from capital accumulation in the problem of the ﬁrm. For an analysis of the impact of capital investment, see
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Martínez-García and Sondergaard (2008).






































Pt+τ is an extension of the one-period ahead IMRS introduced
in (3.2.33). I derive the demand for variety h in the home and foreign markets by combining equations
(3.2.21) − (3.2.24).A s a r e s u l t ,e Y d
t,t+τ (h) and e Y d∗
t,t+τ (h) indicate the per capita demand for any variety h
at home and abroad respectively, given that prices e Pt (h) and e P∗
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and

































Similarly, I characterize the problem of the foreign ﬁrm with the objective of maximizing the expected




















































t+τ is an extension of the one-period IMRS introduced in (3.2.34).
I obtain that e Y d
t,t+τ (f) and e Y d∗

































given that prices e Pt (h) and e P∗
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t + τ.







































18The labor demand functions of the domestic ﬁrms, Ld
t (h) for all h ∈ [0,n], and the foreign ﬁrms, Ld∗
t (f) for
all f ∈ (n,1], are implicit in the cost function of the ﬁrms. The labor markets are fully segmented across












t (f)df . (3.3.13)
where Ls
t is the labor supply of the representative domestic household, and Ls∗
t is the labor supply of the
representative foreign household.
The First-Order Conditions. The Dixit-Stiglitz Pricing Equations. In the polar case where all prices
a r ea d j u s t e di ne a c hp e r i o d( i . e . ,α =0 ) and trade in goods is frictionless, the pricing equations imply that,
PH































which is the outcome expected under monopolistic competition. These formulas are often known as the
Dixit-Stiglitz pricing equations. The LOOP, then, holds in each variety and the pricing decision in either
market is equal to a mark-up times the nominal marginal cost (whenever expressed in units of the same
currency). The gross mark-up, μ ≡ θ
θ−1, is clearly a function of the elasticity of substitution across varieties,
i.e. θ. Often the literature assumes that the elasticity of substitution across varieties is greater than one.
This parametric assumption is meant to insure that the gross mark-up is always above one, as we would
expect it to be.
The Optimal Pricing Equations. The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions for the domestic ﬁrm



































mt,t+τ e Y d∗
t,t+τ (h)St+τ
i . (3.3.17)
Under proper aggregation rules (using the law of large numbers), the price sub-indexes under sticky prices
on domestic varieties, PH
t and PH∗






























19Equations (3.3.18)−(3.3.19) are a convenient way to reformulate (3.2.16). The price-setting rule is symmetric
for all ﬁrms who can re-optimize at time t. The lagged term reﬂects the aggregate behavior of all domestic






















































One way to interpret these equations is that the weighted average of current and future deviations around
the Dixit-Stiglitz pricing rule is expected to be equal to zero.
Similar conditions, pricing rules and price sub-indexes hold for the foreign ﬁrms. The ﬁrst-order conditions


















































t,t+τ e Y d∗
t,t+τ (f)
i , (3.3.23)
while the price sub-indexes under sticky prices on foreign varieties, PF
t and PF∗




























Equations (3.3.24) − (3.3.25) are a convenient way to reformulate (3.2.17). Naturally, equations (3.3.22) −






































































with the same interpretation as (3.3.20)−(3.3.21). It is worthwhile to always remember that in the workhorse
model the prices of the varieties traded in the goods markets may be sticky, but the nominal exchange rate
is still a purely ﬂexible price (ﬂoats freely).
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2002) assume PCP and complete pass-through. Then, the LOOP holds in their
model. Furthermore, in the absence of other features like home bias in preferences or trading costs, their
model also implies absolute PPP. Instead, the workhorse model explored in this paper relies on LCP pricing
as emphasized among others by Devereux and Engel (2003). Widespread local-currency pricing behavior is
20documented among others by Knetter (1993) and Gopinath and Rigobon (2007). Local-currency pricing is,
however, not suﬃcient to guarantee that the LOOP fails. Some degree of nominal rigidities is also necessary
for that to happen.
Wages and Aggregate Output. Wages are a fundamental part of the marginal cost faced by the ﬁrms in
the context of this model as seen in (3.3.3). Wages are determined in a segmented, but otherwise competitive,


























t (f)df , (3.3.29)
where the second equality comes from the fact that technologies are linear-in-labor as described by equations










t (f)df 18. Using the labor supply function derived from the ﬁrst-order conditions of


















These equilibrium conditions deﬁne how wages and marginal costs evolve in the economy. However, real
wages as well as consumption and output are all determined endogenously.
Equations (3.2.21) − (3.2.24) determine the demand function for each variety. That coupled with the




























































































































Aggregate output is a linear function of aggregate labor.
21In equilibrium, aggregate output is aﬀected by a measure of relative price dispersion as can be see from
the equations above. Relative price dispersion and the failure of the LOOP are the consequence of having
introduced nominal rigidities in the model. However, relative price dispersion would appear in the model
whether ﬁrms relied on LCP or PCP pricing, while the LOOP is violated only if ﬁrms price-to-market (LCP
pricing). Anyway, the relative price dispersion wedges are of second-order importance for aggregate output
in the model. Put it diﬀerently, these wedges do not enter into a ﬁrst-order approximation of the aggregate
output equations in (3.3.32) and (3.3.33).

























































































































In a symmetric equilibrium with ﬂexible prices, the relative price of all varieties is identical and price
dispersion has no role in aggregate output. In this sense, it can be said that relative price dispersion at the
variety level deﬁnes the degree of real-side distortions on aggregate output and the impact of misallocated
expenditures caused by the presence of nominal rigidities. These real-side eﬀects, in turn, give a diﬀerent
motivation to monetary policy: money is no longer neutral, at least in the short-run.
3.4 The Fiscal and Monetary Policy
In the spirit of the positive theory of monetary and ﬁscal policy of Mankiw (1987), the government chooses
tax rates and interest rates to ‘reduce’ the welfare loss associated with the underlying distortions of the
economy. In Woodford’s (2003) benchmark model the economy is closed, and asset markets are complete.
The only two distortions are nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. The government, therefore,
requires at least two instruments to be eﬀective: a labor subsidy (ﬁscal policy) and a short-term interest
rate (monetary policy). As I will argue in this section, the international workhorse model is by no means so
straightforward for policy-makers.
The monetary and ﬁscal policies of the domestic government must satisfy a consolidated budget constraint
of the following form,
n
∙





where Gt denotes per capita real government expenditure, Bt is the per capita nominal amount of debt issued
at time t which promises one unit of the local currency tomorrow, and Rt is the nominal total revenues raised
22by the domestic government. All variables are expressed in per capita terms by convenience, except for total
government revenues. I abstract completely from diﬀerent debt maturities and, for simplicity, I impose that
the government does not issue bonds19 and that government spending (whether for consumption purposes
or for investment) is zero. That is, I assume that Gt = Bt =0for all t ≥ 1 and B0 =0 .
Fiat money is an unbacked asset that serves as a unit of account. Each currency serves as the numeraire
in the country where it is issued, and the nominal exchange rate is the relative price between the two
currencies20. Money promises one unit of the local currency in period t +1in exchange for one unit of the
local currency in period t. The government raises a lump-sum tax on household and a proportional tax on




⎣ Tt + φtWtLs
t | {z }
per capita direct taxation
+( Mt − Mt−1)
| {z }




where Mt is the per capita money supply, and Ls
t the per capita labor supply. Taxes on households and
wages imply that Tt > 0 and φt > 0, while a households transfer and a wage subsidy occur if Tt < 0 and
φt < 0.
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t denotes per capita real government expenditure, B∗
t is the per capita nominal amount of debt
issued at time t which promises one unit of the foreign currency tomorrow, and R∗
t are the nominal total
revenues raised by the foreign government. Mt is the per capita money supply, Ls
t the per capita labor
supply, while Tt and φt are the household and wage taxes (or subsidies) respectively. I also assume that
G∗
t = B∗
t =0for all t ≥ 1 and B∗
0 =0 .
Total revenues are the sum of the receipts from direct taxation and seigniorage. First, I ignore the
possibility of independent budgets for the monetary authority and the ﬁscal authority. Nevertheless, the
joint consolidated budget of the ﬁscal authority and the monetary authority must satisfy the constraints
described above. Second, I summarize all possible instruments of ﬁscal policy into a lump-sum tax and a
wage tax (or a wage subsidy). There may be many other taxes as well as a role to be played by government
19I characterize government bonds as uncontingent claims. I could alternatively re-write equation (3.4.1) assuming that
bonds are contingent, but only for the case where asset markets are complete. For the purpose of this paper, the distinction
is of lesser importance because I keep the assumption that all traded assets are in zero-net supply independently of whether
they are government-issued or not and independently of whether they are contingent or uncontingent. I recognize that there
are not many examples of contingent government bonds to speak oﬀ. However, what truly matters is whether households can
write contingent or uncontingent lending contracts between themselves and whether these contracts are open to international
investors (that is, to foreign households).
20In a pure ﬂoat regime, monetary policy is set independently from developments in the foreign exchange market. Here, I
assume that the exchange rate ﬂoats freely and I do not discuss the role that monetary policy may have under a ‘managed’
exchange rate regime. For a discussion of alternative policy regimes (target zones, ﬁxed exchange rates, etc.) and their
implications for exchange rate volatility, see for instance Jeanne and Rose (2002).
23spending and borrowing. However, these instruments suﬃce for the purposes of the model and my focus on
monetary policy. They are also key ingredients in Woodford’s (2003) closed economy model.
While Taylor (1993) introduced one of the staples of monetary theory, Woodford (2003) set the standard
of reference. The aim of monetary and ﬁscal policy in Woodford (2003) is always the frictionless, competitive
allocation. Policy is understood as a set rules implemented by the policy-makers with the aim of driving the
economy towards the frictionless allocation. Whether policy rules are optimal or not depends to a great extent
on the options available to policy-makers, and the welfare costs associated with the policy choice intended
to approximate the frictionless allocation. The literature has placed great emphasis on the properties of
certain rules and their impact on the dynamics of the economy. For instance, short-term interest rate Taylor
rules have become mainstream for monetary policy analysis and very helpful to forecast the behavior of this
policy instrument. Here, I also focus my attention on policy rules.
Fiscal Policy Rules. Woodford (2003) works with a closed-economy framework where there are two basic
frictions arising from nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. The choice of a labor tax/subsidy in










where μ ≡ θ
θ−1 is the mark-up charged by the monopolistic ﬁrms, and θ is the elasticity of substitution across
varieties produced within a country. The ﬁscal authority, therefore, subsidizes labor wages to eliminate the
mark-up. If prices were fully ﬂexible, ﬁrms would set them equal to their marginal costs. Hence, if the
ﬁscal authority takes care of the mark-up, the monetary policy is left with the task of dealing with the
distortion introduced by nominal rigidities alone. In other words, the monetary authority is entrusted with
the responsibility of driving the economy towards the allocation that would prevail if prices were ﬂexible and
ﬁrms perfectly competitive.
The lump-sum taxes/transfers on households, Tt and T∗
t , simply guarantee that the government budget
constraints are satisﬁed in each period. If seigniorage revenues oﬀset the cost of the wage subsidy, the lump-
sum transfer re-distributes whatever is left to households. If seigniorage revenues are insuﬃcient, then the
lump-sum tax will raise enough resources to ﬁnance the subsidy. This tax/transfer scheme on households is
purely non-distortionary. Such idea naturally carries over to a world populated by two countries which are
open to trade in some markets. I adopt it in this paper without much more comment.
However, the simplicity of this ﬁscal policy rule is somewhat misleading. If the elasticity of substitution
across varieties is time-varying (because preferences are not well-approximated with CES aggregators) or
the mark-ups are time-varying for some other reason, then the subsidies may have to be time-varying too.
Other assumptions that may complicate the role of ﬁscal policy if lifted are the following: segregated national
labor markets, ﬂexible and competitive wages, symmetric ﬁrms and households, etc. If mark-ups were time-
varying and ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc, that would require the ﬁscal authority to have in place a very complex
time-varying and ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc labor subsidy scheme. But evidence of such subsidies is hard to
ﬁnd in the data.





t =( 1 − n)Md∗
t , (3.4.7)
where Mt and M∗
t are the money supply in the domestic and foreign country, respectively. The money
market clearing conditions in equations (3.4.6) − (3.4.7) combined with the money demand functions in




























Monetary policy relies on two instruments in practice: the money supply, Mt or M∗
t ,a n dt h es h o r t - t e r m
nominal interest rate, it or i∗
t. From these equations, it follows immediately that of the two monetary
instruments available to the domestic monetary authority, i.e. (Mt,i t), one of them is redundant. Similarly,
for the instruments of the foreign monetary authority. Woodford’s (2003) implicit argument is that having
money or not is completely irrelevant for modelling purposes as long as money itself is non-distortionary.
Relevant monetary policy questions can be addressed without having to refer to the money markets at all.
Monetary policy is determined by the choice of a target rule on the short-term nominal interest rate
in the tradition of Taylor (1993) as advocated in Woodford’s (2003, 2007) research. Then, the monetary
authority simply promises to supply the money market with as much currency as it is required given the
interest rate chosen. Money is supplied locally by the monetary authority and demanded locally too. Money
supply evolves over time, generates seigniorage revenues, and is used to ﬁnance the ﬁscal authority’s budget.
Seigniorage revenues are non-distortionary because the ﬁscal authority does not set its optimal wage subsidy
on the basis of these revenues and whatever is distributed to the households comes in the form of lump-sum
transfers. Moreover, the utility function is additively separable in real balances.
T h eT a y l o rr u l ei so f t e nd e ﬁned as the trademark of modern monetary policy. I assume that the monetary
















































where Zt and Z∗






t−1 are the (gross) CPI inﬂation rates,
Yt and Y ∗
t are the per capita output levels, and Y t and Y
∗








are the output gaps in levels for the domestic and foreign country, respectively. Potential
output is deﬁned as the output level that would prevail in the economy if all frictions could be eliminated,
that is in a frictionless economy with competitive ﬁrms and ﬂexible prices. This index speciﬁcation of the
25Taylor rule takes the standard form once it is log-linearized. The monetary policy index captures both a
smoothing term and a policy component.
Fiscal policy takes care of the mark-up charged by ﬁrms, so monetary policy becomes the tool of choice
to oﬀset the ‘distortions’ caused by nominal rigidities. Disparities in relative prices arise due to price
stickiness. In fact, the more rapid inﬂation grows, the larger are the relative price diﬀerences between
otherwise symmetric ﬁrms. The resulting misallocation of expenditures is thought to be costly in terms of
welfare for the consumers. Price stability, therefore, guarantees that relative price diﬀerences are contained,
that the misallocation of expenditures is limited and that the welfare loss is ‘small’.
With perfect foresight and no uncertainty, it should be possible to set the nominal interest rate in such a
way that prices are stable over time. Therefore, the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities is completely
eliminated. That coupled with the ﬁscal policy suﬃces to attain the desired optimal allocation. With rational
expectations and uncertainty, there is no simple way to implement a monetary policy that guarantees price
stability in every state of nature. Hence, Taylor rules cannot guarantee price stability at every state of the
world anyway. However, Taylor rules are a convenient speciﬁcation for monetary policy because: (a) they
set an objective of price stability in order to force inﬂation and output to revert to their desired targets, and
(b) they explicitly account for a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the output gap to balance the beneﬁts of
price stability against the costs of attaining that goal.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the monetarist view that sound monetary policy should be grounded
in stable money supply growth rules as advocated by Friedman (1960). In Poole’s (2008) own words I must
recognize that: "If the money-demand functions were stable, a central bank that pursued such an interest
rate policy (a Taylor rule) would ﬁnd that the growth rate of the money stock would fall when inﬂation rose
above target. Similarly, under the Taylor rule money growth would tend to rise when inﬂation fell below the
target. If a central bank is successful in maintaining a relatively low rate of inﬂation, the resulting average
growth in the money stock will be relatively low and stable. Hence, a central bank following an appropriately
speciﬁed Taylor rule with an invariant inﬂation target would induce the pattern of money growth that the
monetarists argued was required for a nominal anchor in the economy. The Taylor rule reconciles somewhat
diﬀerent theoretical approaches of economists who emphasize the money stock in their analysis of monetary
policy and those who emphasize interest rates in their analysis."
An ‘Open’ Discussion about Monetary Policy and Openness. My previous discussion is essentially
borrowed from the literature on closed-economies. It follows the treatment in Woodford (2003, chap. 2, sec.
3.3) and Woodford (2007) based on the simple idea that ﬁscal and monetary policy should be implemented
in the presence of frictions in such a way that the eﬀects of those frictions are minimized (to approximate
the outcome of the frictionless allocation). It is not immediately obvious, however, how to extend this logic
to a two-country economy with nominal rigidities, monopolistic ﬁr m sa n dL C P .T h er o l eo fﬁscal policy is
still to eliminate the distortion caused by the mark-up. However, the role of monetary policy becomes more
obscure and complex.
If trade is allowed between these two economies it is not clear that a Taylor rule that targets price stability
and the domestic output gap would suﬃce. For example,
◦ Domestic output gap should not be the only measure of real marginal costs tracked by the domestic
monetary authority, because the foreign output gap also has value as proxy for foreign real marginal costs
(and hence imported inﬂation).
26◦ The potential output in both countries changes as a result of trade openness, and generally depends on
external factors too. As a result, measuring the potential for the domestic economy can be more complex.
◦ Market clearing requires that domestic consumption be equal to domestic output in a closed economy,
but this equality does not necessarily hold true for an open economy. If the monetary authority cares about
the welfare of the domestic households, it could be better to balance the beneﬁts of pursuing price stability
against the costs in terms of a consumption gap rather than an output gap.
Furthermore, even after taking away the mark-up with ﬁscal policy, the distortions of the workhorse
international model are more than the relative price distortions introduced by nominal rigidities. First of all,
there is an implicit assumption that all ﬁrms are specialized in their own varieties and can neither relocate
nor tap into the international inputs market (inputs are non-traded across countries). It is not obvious to
me that specialization in this type of models is due to the competitive advantage of one country over the
other. In fact, it seems to me that if it can be shown that specialization is not due to competitive advantage,
a model build around this restriction on the location of ﬁrms could lead to a sub-optimal allocation. Hence,
if monetary policy is used to ‘push’ the allocation closer to its optimal level, it could come into conﬂict with
its goal of price stability.
Secondly, the workhorse model also implies that ﬁrms rely on pricing-to-market (LCP). In this environ-
ment, movements in the nominal exchange rate -which is assumed to be a ﬂexible price- can induce large
misallocations of expenditure across countries because the LOOP fails to hold. It is not clear how monetary
policy should respond to this type of relative price distortions in the external sector (if at all). This is just
another worry that policy-makers should have because of openness and international pricing behavior which
is completely alien to the closed-economy literature.
Finally, a common variant of the workhorse model allows for frictions in the asset markets to be considered.
This is the case of the bond economy described in this paper. But, what monetary policy is or ought to
be if asset markets are incomplete is not clear either. Incomplete asset markets implies that households in
each country have only limited opportunities to pool risks among themselves. Conceivably models could be
w r i t t e ni nw h i c ht h eﬁscal and monetary authorities can provide some degree of insurance for households.
However, manipulating monetary policy for risk-sharing purposes may come into conﬂict with the objective
of price stability too.
3.5 The Resource Constraint
The structure of asset markets has obvious implications for the degree of risk-sharing that can be attained
across countries and for ﬁnancing the trade balance. But the results presented here are general enough, so
I focus on the complete asset speciﬁcation (unless otherwise noted). If I aggregate the budget constraint of
the domestic household in (3.2.3) with the consolidated domestic government budget constraint in (3.4.1)−























t−1 (ωt)+Πt +( 1+φt)WtLs
t.
(3.5.1)
27Similarly, it follows that if I aggregate the budget constraint of the foreign household in (3.2.4) with the




































Equations (3.5.1) and (3.5.2) hold with equality in equilibrium. Using the money market clearing conditions
described in (3.4.6)−(3.4.7), the deﬁnitions of per capita proﬁts distributed to the representative household
in each country as given by (3.3.10) and (3.3.11), and the labor market clearing conditions in equations
















































Equations (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) can easily be adapted to reﬂect that only trade in uncontingent bonds is
possible, as posited in the incomplete asset markets setting discussed in this paper.
Real and Nominal Goods Market Clearing Conditions. Given the fact that all ﬁrms are committed
to satisfy the household demands at the given prices, the market clearing condition for any given variety in
either location can be computed as,
Yt (h)=nCt (h)+( 1− n)C∗
t (h), ∀h ∈ [0,n], (3.5.5)
Y ∗
t (f)=nCt (f)+( 1− n)C∗
t (f), ∀f ∈ (n,1]. (3.5.6)
The demand functions for each variety of goods are analyzed in equations (3.2.21) − (3.2.24). The implicit
assumption that preferences over diﬀerent varieties within a bundle (either domestic or foreign) are identical




































































































where Yt are the units of output produced per ﬁr mi nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,Y ∗
t are the units of output produced
per ﬁrm in the foreign country, and PPIH
t and PPIF∗
t are the corresponding producer price indexes (PPI)
28expressed in the local currency of the domestic and foreign country, respectively.
The expressions within brackets in the previous equations are a measure of relative price dispersion
across ﬁrms within a given location. From the deﬁnitions of the price indexes for the bundles of domestic
and foreign varieties in (3.2.16)−(3.2.17), it immediately follows that these measures of dispersion aggregate
to one. Therefore, I obtain that,
nPPIH
t Yt = nPH
t CH










t +( 1− n)PF∗
t CF∗
t , (3.5.10)
while the market clearing condition for each country can be expressed in real terms as,
nYt = nCH
t +( 1− n)CH∗
t , (3.5.11)
(1 − n)Y ∗
t = nCF
t +( 1− n)CF∗
t . (3.5.12)









































In other words, each PPI is a weighted sum of the aggregate prices of the bundle of goods in both the local
and the foreign markets expressed in the nominal currency of the producer. The weights are the shares of
output produced to be sold in each market.
Using the demand functions for each variety of goods in equations (3.2.21) − (3.2.24) one more time, I
























































(1 − n)Y ∗
















Naturally, the sum of the real aggregate output in both countries equals the sum of the real aggregate
29consumption,
nYt +( 1− n)Y ∗
t = nCt +( 1− n)C∗
t , (3.5.19)
which follows from the market clearing conditions above. I can also derive an alternative characterization of








































































































If absolute PPP were to hold, which in the context of the workhorse model requires the LOOP to hold and
no home bias in consumption (i.e., ξ = ξ
∗), then the local PPI corresponds exactly to the local CPI. In other
words, it is true that PPIt = Pt and PPI∗
t = P∗
t .
This long digression on the diﬀerences between the CPI and the PPI, or consumption-based and producer-
based prices, is also meant to reinforce the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between the nominal
resource constraint of each country and the market clearing conditions in real terms. It is also important
to realize that my deﬁnition of the PPI is not necessarily equivalent to the CPI. This is a subject that has
received some attention specially in policy circles because not everybody agrees that targeting the CPI is
the best strategy for monetary policy. I do not cover the discussion in this paper for lack of space.
The Current Account, the Capital Account and the Trade Balance. Following on the previous











































































where the real exchange rate is deﬁned as in equation (3.2.19). These pair of equations in per capita terms
hold true independently of whether the prices are ﬂexible or sticky. The per capita current account equations

























































































































































Nominal Capital (and Financial) Account of Country F
(3.5.24)
Equations (3.5.23) and (3.5.24) are expressed in nominal terms using their respective local currencies as
numeraire. The ﬁrst term inside brackets in the left-hand side is the nominal trade balance of each country.
The second term inside brackets in the left-hand side is the service balance. The sum of the trade balance and
the service balance is the current account. The terms in the right-hand side represent the capital account,
that is the inﬂow or outﬂow of capital. A current account deﬁcit (surplus) automatically equates to a capital
account surplus (deﬁcit).
The current account of the balance of payments (BoP) is the sum of the trade balance (exports minus
imports of goods and services) and the services balance (which includes net factor incomes such as interests
and dividends, and net transfer payments such as foreign aid). The trade balance is typically the most
important part of the current account. The BoP in the oﬃcial statistics often includes an accounting item
to balance net errors and omissions which, for obvious reasons, must be ignored in the model.
The oﬃcial reserves (including foreign exchange reserves, oﬃcial gold reserves, and IMF Special Drawing
Rights, all denominated in foreign currency) should also be added to the BoP. In this paper I abstract from
foreign reserves entirely, which means that the monetary authority looses a policy instrument often used for
31interventions in the foreign exchange market. This is consistent with my focus on a free-ﬂoating exchange
rate regime. As noted previously, I also abstract from the possibility that private agents would demand
foreign currency. Hence, money supply does not enter neither the capital account nor the ﬁnancial services
account in the workhorse model.
The World Nominal Trade Balance. The Arrow-Debreu securities can be simply interpreted as bor-
rowing and lending short-term contracts between the households in both countries, since the government
neither borrows nor lends in the model. The market clearing condition for the Arrow-Debreu securities
requires that,
nBH
t (ωt+1)+( 1− n)BH∗
t (ωt+1)=nBs
t (ωt+1)=0 , (3.5.25)
nBF
t (ωt+1)+( 1− n)BF∗
t (ωt+1)=( 1 − n)Bs∗
t (ωt+1)=0 , (3.5.26)
where Bs
t (ωt+1) and Bs∗
t (ωt+1) are the per capita supply of each claim. All claims are in zero net supply.
The asset market clearing conditions must hold true for all period t and for all events in the space ωt+1 ∈ Ω.
Furthermore, the intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition on the household’s problem given in equation (3.2.27)
tells me that in equilibrium Qt (ωt+1)=Q∗
t (ωt+1) St
St+1(ωt+1). Let me aggregate the current account equations
of both countries as given by (3.5.21) and (3.5.22) across all households, transform the equations to be quoted


























































































































which implies that the nominal trade balance surplus in one country has to be equal to the nominal trade
balance deﬁcit in the other country whenever expressed in the same currency (as expected).
In other words, the nominal trade balance of the entire world has to be equal to zero when expressed in












(1 − n)Y ∗




32while in real terms it holds true that21,
(nYt +( 1− n)Y ∗
t ) − (nCt +( 1− n)C∗
t )=0 , (3.5.30)
from the goods market clearing conditions in (3.5.17)−(3.5.18). These pair of equations shows that diﬀerences
in the equilibrium conditions between the nominal and the real values arise from ﬂuctuations in the real
exchange rate and from discrepancies between PPIs and CPIs. Both of which are the result of home bias in
preferences and violations of the LOOP due to sticky prices and LCP pricing.
The Current Account Equation with Incomplete Asset Markets. From equation (3.5.21) and the
intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition in (3.2.27), it follows that the domestic nominal current account equation
can be expressed as,
Z
ωt+1∈Ω























where I deﬁne the net borrowing as Bt (ωt+1) ≡ BH
t (ωt+1)+St+1 (ωt+1)BF
t (ωt+1). Alternatively, I could
also redeﬁne the current account equation for the foreign country in (3.5.22) by noting that foreign net
borrowing can be expressed as B∗
t (ωt+1) ≡ 1
St+1(ωt+1)BH∗
t (ωt+1)+BF∗







































































where Bt ≡ BH
t + St+1BF
t and αt ≡
St+1BF
t





















































21This is a condition that holds true no matter what assets are available for trade, or which nominal rigidities are present,
and so on. In the end, nominal output must be equal to nominal consumption in the world. This expression, however, reﬂects
some of the simpliﬁcations of the workhorse model. On one hand, the government may also demand a share of each variety of
goods. On the other hand, the complexity of adding either durable goods or investment goods to the mix of international trade
is particularly important given the share of these goods in total trade. But, neither one of those is considered here explicitly.
33The Real Exports, Real Imports and Real Net Exports. The aggregate imports of the domestic






















while the aggregate exports of the domestic country in real terms are derived from (3.2.21) and (3.2.23) as,


























In a two-country model it must be the case that aggregate imports (exports) of the domestic country
correspond to aggregate exports (imports) of the foreign country. In other words, IMt = EX∗
t and EXt =
IM∗
t . There is no need to emphasize that point further. Naturally, the real net exports per capita in the
domestic country, NXt, can be computed as,








































The domestic aggregate real net exports, nNXt, is equal to the aggregate real net exports of the foreign
country with the opposite sign. Using equation (3.3.32) for aggregate output, it follows that the real net
exports can be re-expressed as,








































































in terms of domestic aggregate output and consumption, as well as relative prices.





































































and comes also expressed in per capita terms. The third equality follows from manipulating the domestic
CPI formula in (3.2.14). As noted before, the aggregate nominal trade balance in the domestic country,
nTBt, is equal to the aggregate nominal trade balance of the foreign country with the opposite sign. The
34nominal trade balance can be combined with (3.5.15) to obtain that,
nTBt = nPPItYt − nPtCt. (3.5.38)
Usually, the deﬁnition of the real trade balance in units of the consumption good that we compute is TB t
Pt ,
instead of the real net exports, NXt.
3.6 The Six Puzzles: Revisited
By now, it should be evident that the workhorse model either avoids or exogenously imposes certain features
designed to side-step the modelling hurdles of a fully integrated theory of the six puzzles. The model is
naturally positioned to become the benchmark for the international correlations puzzle, the PPP puzzle and
to some extent the exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
The assumption of home bias in preferences proposed by Warnock (2003) allows me to exogenously
replicate the real trade patterns noted in the home bias in trade puzzle. It certainly allows me to regulate the
amount of imports and exports in steady state to account for the observation that cross-border trade seems
to be more limited than we would anticipate. I have already pointed out that these preference speciﬁcation
introduces compositional eﬀects that can explain ﬂuctuations of the real exchange rate even if the LOOP
condition holds. Some compositional eﬀects may be relevant to explain movements in real exchange rates
and a pervasive bias in trade. However, this is unlikely to be the whole story on both accounts.
The workhorse model also assumes that there are neither capital investment goods nor durable goods.
Moreover, the production function is linear in labor. This makes the model ill-equipped to convincingly
account for the savings-investment (or Feldstein-Horioka) puzzle. It also limits the ability of the model to
replicate certain features on net exports and exchange rates (e.g., Martínez-García and Sondergaard, 2008)
and exports and imports (e.g., Engel and Wang, 2007). Moreover, it eliminates certain margins of great
interest like investing in capital to move production intertemporally.
Finally, the assumption that portfolios of the local ﬁrms are solely owned by the local households imposes
exogenously a strict home bias that is consistent with the home bias in equity portfolios puzzle. The model
still allows for either contingent or uncontingent bonds to be traded internationally. Hence, it can say
something about the degree of home bias in bonds instead (under incomplete asset markets). Nonetheless,
the model cannot account endogenously for and explain the overwhelming evidence of ‘insuﬃcient’ portfolio
diversiﬁcation.
The question that we should always keep in mind is to what extent these simpliﬁcations and exogenous
restrictions are also distorting our understanding of the three puzzles around which much of the current
international business cycle literature has developed. It is not obvious to me that these simpliﬁcations are
just ‘innocuous’.
4 The Frictionless Allocation
Here, I re-write the basic building blocks of the model by assuming that the economy is fully ﬂexible, fric-
tionless and competitive. The result characterizes the frictionless allocation and, more concretely, identiﬁes
the potential output of each country, i.e. Y t and Y
∗
t. Potential output is necessary to deﬁne the output gap
35measure that enters into the monetary policy rules in (3.4.12)−(3.4.13). In order to notationally distinguish
this frictionless equilibrium I denote the variables with an upper bar. Productivity shocks are unaﬀected by
t h ep r e s e n c eo ff r i c t i o n si nt h em o d e lo rl a c kt h e r e o f ,h e n c et h e yd on o tr e q u i r ead i ﬀerent notation.
Using the equilibrium conditions in the labor market as discussed in (3.3.30) − (3.3.31), I express the






















































































Fiscal policy is optimally implemented and completely eliminates the distortion caused by the mark-up as
in (3.4.5),i . e .φt = φ
∗
t = −1
θ . Alternatively, I could have assumed that prices are competitive and equal to
marginal costs. Therefore, each individual ﬁrm charges a price equal to marginal costs and, by symmetry,



































These pair of equations, however, depends on consumption, output and prices (all of which are endogenously
determined).
By assuming that ﬁscal policy in this fashion, I eliminate the mark-up which is the distortion introduced
by monopolistic competition. The economy behaves as if it was populated by perfectly competitive ﬁrms. I
also assume complete asset markets to avoid the distortions due to incompleteness. As a result, the perfect









where υ =1after normalization of the steady state. Moreover, I assume that prices are fully ﬂexible,
which immediately implies that the LOOP holds (independently of whether ﬁrms price-to-market or not).
Eliminating this friction, however, does not mean the real exchange rate should be constant because I still
maintain the assumption that households have home bias on consumption. The real exchange rate can be

















The model under these conditions is, therefore, equivalent to one where prices are fully ﬂexible, ﬁrms are
perfectly competitive, and asset markets are complete.

























































































































































where the second equality comes from the perfect international risk-sharing condition in (3.2.29).E q u a t i o n s
(4.6)−(4.7) for the real exchange rate and the terms of trade can be naturally interpreted as two non-linear

















In other words, both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade are functions of the output ratio. Based
































































































are a function of terms of trade and therefore also connected to the aggregate output ratio.
Using this information about the structure of the economy and the aggregate output equations in
(3.3.36) − (3.3.37), I can re-write the aggregate consumption in terms of aggregate output (appropriately























































































which are functional forms that depend exclusively on the output in both countries. The model shows
that aggregate consumption is a function of output in both countries. This relationship can be derived



























) inside the equilibrium labor market clearing conditions in (4.3) − (4.4),Ii m m e d i a t e l y










































This is a system of two equations in two unknowns that can be resolved.
Finding a solution for the system in (4.16) − (4.17) implies, in general, that output in each country is a
function of productivity shocks in both countries. To be more precise, the equilibrium level of employment
varies (non-linearly) with the productivity shocks in both countries and, as a result, local output also
responds to the foreign productivity shocks. The formulas take a highly non-linear form, which I do not
derive explicitly, but nevertheless convey two important ideas. First, that monetary policy is neutral under
ﬂexible prices, perfect competition and complete asset markets. So, money aﬀects the nominal variables
(wages and prices), but it has no real-side eﬀects (on employment and output). Second, openness has a
direct eﬀect on the real-side of the economy because, unlike in the case of autarky, it implies that equilibrium
aggregate employment responds to foreign shocks.
Id e ﬁne the functional forms for output and employment generically as,













and I assume that these expressions represent and reﬂect the true ‘potential’ of the economy (in terms of
output and employment). If monetary policy targets deviations of output from its potential, as posited by
38the Taylor rule, it can no longer ignore the foreign productivity shocks (except in special cases as in Corsetti
and Pesenti, 2001). Therefore, it becomes ever more clear that monetary policy cannot be conducted looking
at domestic sources or domestic shocks in isolation.
A Special Case: Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), let me assume that
the preferences are logarithmic in aggregate consumption (i.e., γ =1 ) and that the elasticity of substitution
across bundles of goods is equal to one (i.e., σ =1 ), then I argue that the real exchange rate and terms of

























































In other words, both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade are very simple functions of the output
ratio properly adjusted to take into account the home bias in consumption. If the elasticity of substitution





































Using this information about the structure of the economy and the aggregate output equations in (3.3.36)−
(3.3.37), I can naturally re-write the aggregate consumption in terms of aggregate output (appropriately


















































































In this particular example, the aggregate consumption is proportional to the aggregate world output com-
puted using the consumption aggregator. This reﬂects the fact that each household consumes a constant
fraction of the total output produced locally and a diﬀerent (but still constant) fraction of the output pro-
duced abroad. However, this is only a special case. In general, the model shows that aggregate consumption
ought to be a more complex function of output in both countries.



























) inside the equilibrium labor
39market clearing conditions in (4.3) − (4.4), I immediately derive an explicit pair of equilibrium conditions















































This is a very special case in which aggregate output only depends on the local productivity shock. Another














































Openness has only a limited impact. It only varies the size of the constant labor employment and the
aggregate output level because output must be produced now to satisfy the foreign demand. In this context,
potential output depends only on domestic shocks and, therefore, monetary policy can be conducted as
usual: by targeting a measure of potential output that is purely domestic, and depends on domestic shocks
only.
The Nominal Exchange Rate in the Frictionless Economy. Money is neutral in a frictionless econ-
omy. CPI inﬂation is induced by the monetary authority’s willingness to interfere with the nominal interest
rate. Although, monetary policy can act as a conduit that allows real-shocks (and probably other shocks
too) to have an impact on the price level and inﬂation, it is still true that the domestic inﬂation is determined
and can be regulated by the domestic monetary policy. Openness to trade on goods and assets has no eﬀect
whatsoever on the ability of the domestic monetary authority to control domestic inﬂation.
T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed e s c r i b e di n(4.6) is known to be a function of the productivity shocks. Using
the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate it is possible to write the nominal exchange rate as the product of















Even in an elementary model like this one, monetary policy is not the only source of fundamental shocks
driving the nominal exchange rate. As a matter of fact, it is arguably possible to write a model where the
monetary policy is such that CPIs are very stable in both countries. The outcome of that model would be
that very little of the ﬂuctuations of the nominal exchange rate has to do with monetary shocks in either
country. Hence, the nominal exchange rate mostly reﬂects the impact of productivity shocks. This could
be related to the exchange rate disconnect puzzle since it gives little role to monetary policy shocks in the
22This nominal exchange rate should be consistent with the intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition of the household’s problem in
either (3.2.27) or (3.2.32).
40nominal exchange rate, but it certainly does not help us explain the high volatility observed in the data.
The crucial lesson here, anyway, is that real shocks can aﬀect the nominal exchange rate because PPP fails.
However, the sensitivity of the nominal exchange rate to real shocks depends on what determines the failure
of PPP. In other words, the eﬀects due to non-traded goods or LOOP violations may be very diﬀerent.
5 The Irrelevance of Asset Markets
The irrelevance of asset markets is a result often cited, but one that needs further exploration. Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) are credited with having pointed out this result, which has been subsequently studied by
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). It states that under certain assumptions, the structure
of the asset markets has no impact on the allocation of the economy. I have demonstrated already that
if prices are ﬂexible and ﬁrms are competitive, then monetary policy is neutral. Now, I shall demonstrate
that in certain cases asset markets are irrelevant. Therefore, ﬁnancial openness may have no impact on the
allocation and, therefore, should not enter as a consideration in monetary policy decisions.
I assume that the preferences are logarithmic (and additively separable) in consumption, i.e. γ =1 ,a n d
the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign bundle of goods is equal to one, i.e. σ =1 .I
know from the demand functions in equations (3.2.23) − (3.2.24) that,
PH
t CH








t =( 1 − ξ)PtCt,P F∗
t CF∗










t = nPtCt, (5.3)
(1 − n)PH∗
t CH∗
t +( 1− n)PF∗
t CF∗
t =( 1 − n)P∗
t C∗
t , (5.4)
while the aggregate income described in equations (3.5.9) − (3.5.10) is equal to,
nPPIH






t = n(1 − ξ)
1
St




Hence, the aggregate nominal trade balance expressed in the same currency should be equal to,
nTBt = nPPIH





=( 1 − n)PPIF∗
t Y ∗
t − (1 − n)P∗
t C∗
t , (5.8)
where TBt and TB∗
t are nominal quantities in per capita terms. Equation (3.5.29) clearly establishes a
relationship between the nominal trade balance in both countries which is given by,
(nPPItYt − nPtCt)+St ((1 − n)PPI∗
t Y ∗
t − (1 − n)P∗
t C∗
t )=0 , (5.9)
41or simply by,
nTBt =( 1− n)TB∗
t . (5.10)
I can use the nominal trade balance as expressed in equations (5.7) − (5.8) and the aggregate income value
d e r i v e di ne q u a t i o n s(5.5) − (5.6) to write that,
nPtCt + nTBt = nPPIH









=( 1 − n)PPIF∗
t Y ∗
t = n(1 − ξ)
1
St











































L e tm ea s s u m et h ep o l a rc a s ew h e r et h easset markets are complete. Under complete asset markets,
the perfect international risk-sharing condition given by (3.2.29) holds, so I can write the domestic nominal
trade balance in the following terms,
nTBt =
∙µ
nξ +( 1− n)ξ
∗υ
n +( 1− n)υ
¶
(1 − n)υ −
µ
n(1 − ξ)+( 1− n)(1− ξ
∗)υ





where υ =1after normalization of the steady state. Further algebra allows me to compute the following
formula for the nominal trade balance,
nTBt =[ ( 1− n)ξ
∗ − n(1 − ξ)]PtCt. (5.16)
The way the model is written, it follows that the nominal trade balance is equal to zero if and only if,
(1 − n)ξ







This condition is at the center of the irrelevance result.
Let me assume the polar opposite case where the asset markets are fully separated and no cross-country
asset trading is permitted. This case is also discussed in Woodford (2007). I do not take a stand on the
number of assets available within each local market, so there may be less than a full set of Arrow-Debreu
securities. If asset trading does not occur in the international markets, then the nominal trade balance
must be equal to zero in every period. International borrowing and lending is simply impossible. Based on























and naturally it follows that,
(nξCt +( 1− n)ξ
∗RStC∗
t )RSt (1 − n)C∗
t =( n(1 − ξ)Ct +( 1− n)(1− ξ
∗)RStC∗
t )nCt. (5.19)
Simple algebra tells me that the real exchange rate can be pin down as a second-order equation,
ξ
∗ ((1 − n)C∗
t )
2 (RSt)
2 +[ ξ − (1 − ξ
∗)]((1 − n)C∗
t )(nCt)RSt − (1 − ξ)(nCt)
2 =0 . (5.20)
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2 +4 ξ








where only the positive root gives a solution that is consistent with the real exchange rate being positive. I
suppose that the preference parameters satisfy the condition in (5.17), then it follows that the real exchange


























which again coincides with the real exchange rate that would prevail if the asset markets were complete and
both countries were able to perfectly share their risks.
The point of these calculations is that an optimal allocation can be attained with no trade at all in
assets. Trading in the goods market suﬃces to attain the optimal allocation. In fact, the allocation attained
should be the same independently of whether I allow for unrestricted asset trading internationally and have
a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities to do so or I impose that international trade is infeasible and
the local asset markets have only a limited number of assets to trade on. The same logic applies to other
intermediate cases where international asset trading is possible, but asset markets are not complete. It is
always possible to attain the perfect risk-sharing allocation without having to resort to the asset markets at
all. Therefore, the availability of more or less assets should not make a diﬀerence.
Let me review the implicit and explicit assumptions of these exercise. First, I have explicitly required
logarithmic (and additively separable) preferences on consumption, i.e. γ =1 . Second, I have required
that the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the foreign bundle of goods be equal to one in
both countries (Cobb-Douglas aggregator), i.e. σ =1 . Third, I have to impose that the combination of
the population size in each country and the shares of local consumption satisfy that (1 − n)ξ
∗ = n(1 − ξ).
Forth, implicitly I have made the assumption that the initial condition on the net foreign asset position of
each country be equal to zero. Obviously, if I assume that one country starts as a net debtor (and the other
as a net creditor), the trade balance can not be zero from that point onwards because the debtor country
needs to either trade goods with the other country to repay its debts or simply needs to borrow more.
43The irrelevance of the asset market structure is a very powerful an interesting result and it has been
widely exploited to simplify the model in cases where asset trading or the nominal trade balance are deemed
of secondary importance for the questions being asked. Of course, in this particular case, increased ﬁnancial
openness has no consequences whatsoever for the determination of the aggregate demand under any monetary
policy rule. Woodford (2007, p. 8) argues that "the fact that complete irrelevance is possible (and does not
even require an ‘extreme’ preference speciﬁcation) indicates that the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization need
not be large". This irrelevance result is a very special case, convenient as it may be, so I would caution from
reading too much into Woodford’s (2007) argument. This paper tries to shed some light on the very complex
phenomenon of ﬁnancial globalization. For the more advanced readers, I would suggest to start with the
papers of Evans and Hnatkovska (2005, 2007).
As relevant as portfolio allocations can be in order to address certain speciﬁc questions, like what explains
the fact that some countries have very large capital account surpluses (for example, Spain and the U.S.)
while others do not, the issue is of secondary importance in this paper. What matters is how the set of
available assets aﬀects the risk-sharing opportunities of households and their consumption-savings margin.
Beyond that, as I will discuss later, portfolio allocations are not needed to close the model. In this sense,
portfolio allocations could be derived endogenously as a ‘residual’ after ﬁrst having determined the optimal
allocation of resources. Following in the spirit of Evans and Hnatkovska (2005, 2007) that only requires a
second-order approximation of the asset pricing equations and either the optimal allocation of resources or
a number of conditions that would characterize it appropriately.
6 The Deterministic Steady State23
6.1 The Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
I require that all shocks be evaluated at their unconditional mean in steady state. The steady state pro-
ductivity shocks are denoted, A and A∗, while the monetary policy shocks are denoted, Z and Z∗.I a l s o
conjecture the existence of a (symmetric) deterministic steady state in which prices, consumption and the
nominal exchange rate are constant, i.e.










St+1 = St = S. (6.1.3)
I often refer to this steady state as the zero-inﬂation steady state.
Given my steady state conjecture and the Euler equations in (3.2.31) and (3.2.32), it follows that the
steady state nominal interest rate in both countries is identical and equal to the inverse of the rate of the








23The initial conditions of the model at time t =0should naturally correspond to the steady state values.
44which holds true for the case of incomplete asset markets. Under complete asset markets, I can also argue




















which is consistent with my ﬁndings on the steady state interest rate. The invariant distribution function is
denoted μ(ω). The assumption that the nominal exchange rate is constant satisﬁes also the intertemporal
ﬁrst-order conditions in either (3.2.27) or (3.2.32).
From the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions in (3.3.16)−(3.3.17) and (3.3.22)−(3.3.23), I obtain that the LOOP
holds in steady state, i.e.





























The ﬁscal policy rule in this model is time-invariant, as described in (3.4.5). Furthermore, it cancels out the
eﬀect of the mark-up charged by ﬁrms and results in a competitive Dixit-Stiglitz price-setting rule for all
varieties in steady state, i.e.



















where the price equals the marginal cost. In other words, the pricing behavior of these monopolistic com-
petitors is observationally equivalent to the behavior of perfectly competitive ﬁrms. The steady state price
sub-indexes in equations (3.3.18) − (3.3.19) and (3.3.24) − (3.3.25) simply become,
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The LOOP holds also at the level of the aggregate bundles of goods produced at home and abroad. Using
the price indexes in equations (3.2.14) and (3.2.15) evaluated at their steady state, I also infer that the real
45exchange rate should be equal to,
P =
"







































H denotes the steady state terms of trade. Absolute PPP holds in steady state (and
the real exchange rate equals to one) only if preferences on consumption are identical across countries, i.e.
ξ = ξ
∗, or the terms of trade are equal to one in steady state. Relative PPP holds in steady state, but not
absolute PPP, whenever the preferences diﬀer across countries due to home-bias in consumption and terms
of trade are not equal to zero. In the workhorse model, the diﬀerence between the long-run price of a basket
of goods in either country expressed in terms of the same currency is a function of the steady state value of
the terms of trade.
These ﬁndings prove that, if a zero-inﬂation steady state exists as conjectured, the LOOP holds and the
pricing decisions of ﬁrms are equivalent to those of (symmetric) competitive ﬁrms under ﬂexible prices. The
steady state is also observationally equivalent whether asset markets are complete or not, as I shall discuss
shortly. In other words, the steady state for any variant of the workhorse model that I explore here (with
nominal rigidities, LCP pricing and/or incomplete asset markets) is equivalent to the steady state of the
frictionless allocation described in subsection 4. That explains the notational convention of describing all
endogenous steady state variables by dropping the time subscript and marking them with an ‘upper bar’ (as
in the frictionless model).
The Other Real Steady State Variables. The analytic results reported in subsection 4 serve me to
argue that the steady state real exchange rate, i.e. RS, the steady state terms of trade, i.e. TOT,t h e
steady state total consumption, i.e. C and C
∗
, the steady state output, i.e. Y and Y
∗
, and the steady state
employment, i.e. L and L
∗
, are all functions of the steady state productivity shocks in both countries (and
the structural parameters of the model). Taking that as given, I can infer real wages from the ﬁrst-order
conditions on labor supply given by (3.2.38)−(3.2.39), or from the labor market clearing conditions discussed

























noting that in steady state both labor and output are functions of the steady state productivity shocks only.
The demand for each variety and for the entire bundle of goods in each country can be obtained from














































































The pricing for each variety and for the bundle of goods in each country comes from the optimal pricing
equations in (3.3.14) − (3.3.15) and can be expressed relative to the CPI, by manipulating the indexes in


























































These prices ratios are, not surprisingly, purely determined by real variables even in steady state.
The Nominal Steady State Variables. I should point out that the Taylor rules in the spirit of equations
(3.4.12) − (3.4.13), and the Euler equations in (3.2.30) − (3.2.31) are not suﬃcient to pin down the steady
state price level. Although the system is consistent with the conjecture that the inﬂation should be zero in






∗ = β, (6.1.21)

















































This means that by enforcing a Taylor rule the long-run inﬂation target of the monetary authority becomes
the steady state level. By construction, therefore, price stability is guaranteed in the steady state. However,
this is not suﬃcient to determine the price level in steady state. It only guarantees that the price level
is unchanged in steady state. Under price stability, the Euler equations also imply that the steady state
nominal and real interest rates are determined by the subjective discount factor, β.
The determination of the price level may seem of little practical value since the log-linearized version of
47the workhorse model that I explore in this paper depends on the inﬂation dynamics and not on the price
level itself. Relative prices do matter, however, but those are determined by real shocks in the steady state.
However, as it turns out neither the nominal wages nor the nominal exchange rate (or any other nominal
price) can be identiﬁed in steady state without knowing the price level ﬁrst. Hence, I cannot simply ignore
the issue.
The steady state version of the money market clearing conditions given by (3.4.8)−(3.4.9) characterizes




























which is arranged to reﬂect that the monetary authority can alter the price level in steady state by manipu-
lating the steady state money supply. While in the short-run money supply is endogenously determined by
the model after the monetary authority sets a Taylor interest rate rule, in the long-run (more speciﬁcally
in steady state) it is not. As a result, the monetary authority could set the long-run money supply and
determine the price level in steady state.
Moreover, what this entails for monetary policy is that: (a) the short-term interest rate that the monetary
authority tries to manipulate in response to short-term deviations of the inﬂation rate must be consistent
with its long-run gross rate, β
−1 (which in the context of the model is completely independent of policy
choice), and (b) the long-run inﬂation rate is zero, but the long-run CPI level depends on the long-run money
supply of the economy. Therefore, if monetary policy is going to determine the price level in the long-run it
has to be the case that long-run money supply is being used to determine the price level.
In other words, there is a case to be made as to why the monetary authority may care about the long-run
trends of money supply. Imagine an economy that lies on a steady state. If money supply is increased
because the monetary authority decides to allow more liquidity in the markets than its average trend it may
create inﬂation and a transition towards a new steady state with higher price levels. If money is not neutral,
this may come at a cost in the short-run. In any event, letting the long-run money supply loose introduces
unnecessary noise in the system.
In summary, the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rates in the short-run, but cannot
control the long-run interest rates. In steady state, those depend on the time preference of households.
Monetary policy commonly relies on a Taylor interest rule to deal with the inﬂation dynamics (and to some
extent with the ﬂuctuations over the business cycle) and this rule, in turn, endogenously deﬁnes the short-
run path of the money supply. In the long-run, however, the Taylor rule does not constraint the price level
or the money supply, and the steady state interest rates cannot be controlled by policy-makers. Hence,
policy-makers could still exercise some control over the price level by regulating the money supply (but only
over the long-run).
The Steady State of the External Sector. Using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate in (3.2.19),
which is a function of the steady state values of the productivity shock in both countries (as implied in
subsection 4), it is possible to write the nominal exchange rate as the product of this function and the ratio
48of the CPIs in both countries, i.e.




w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ei n t e r t e m p o r a lﬁrst-order condition of the households’ problem in either (3.2.27)
or (3.2.32). I can also use the domestic current account equation in (3.5.31) for the complete asset markets
case and equation (3.5.33) for the incomplete asset markets case in order to identify the steady state trade
balance.
There are a few comments that deserve to be noted explicitly here. First, I have considered all along
that the deterministic steady state should correspond to that of the frictionless allocation independently of
whether the model in its full complexity has nominal rigidities and/or incomplete asset markets features.
Naturally, if a deterministic steady state does exist, whether the workhorse model has multiple Arrow-Debreu
securities traded internationally or just one bond is completely irrelevant. As can be seen from the current
account equation: whatever the optimal trade balance is for the steady state frictionless economy, it can
be implemented in steady for an economy where only one asset is available. Because the steady state is
deterministic there is no uncertainty and, therefore, having more assets is irrelevant. In this steady state,
the outcome should be observationally equivalent to that under complete asset markets24.
Second, I argue that the portfolio allocation is indeterminate in this steady state. But I also maintain that
it is not necessary to take a stand about portfolio allocations in this paper because we are concerned with
the resource allocation instead. And, as I discuss later on, portfolio allocations are not needed to pin down
the resource allocations of the workhorse model. Finally, independent of the portfolio structure, the only
thing that really matters in steady state is the net borrowing that is attained in real terms. Alternatively, I





















(A,A∗) − C (A,A∗).
(6.1.27)
Not surprisingly, the real trade balance is a function of the steady state productivity shock levels in both
countries.
I can determine the steady state of real wages, real balances and the real trade balance. However,
obtaining the steady state for nominal wages, the nominal trade balance, the nominal exchange rate or even
the price of domestic and foreign goods requires that I pin down the steady state level of the CPI in both
countries. Hence, the relevance of my previous discussion on the subject.
6.2 The Normalization of the Steady State25
I shall impose a number of normalizations that make the linearization exercise much easier. It is worthwhile
to be explicit about these choices, because they are very common in the literature but not always trivial.
24I have shown that in steady state asset market incompleteness and nominal rigidities coupled with LCP pricing don’t matter
at all. The steady state of any model that combines either one of these frictions in the goods market and the assets market is
the same as the steady state that can be found for the case of complete asset markets, ﬂexible prices and competitive ﬁrms.
Therefore, the steady state follows directly from the results that I already discussed in subsection 4.










49First, I assume that the long-run level for the monetary shocks to the Taylor rule is equal to one. In other
words, without loss of generality Z = Z∗ =1 . I could assume that the long-run money supply (i.e., the
initial condition on the money supply regime) needed to pin down the price level is also equal to one, i.e.
M = M
∗
=1 . However, the steady state of the workhorse model corresponds to the steady state of the
frictionless model. In that scenario, money is neutral and it seems reasonable to assume that the consumption
good plays the role of numeraire (as it is often done in the RBC literature), i.e. P = P
∗
=1 .F o r t h i s






















This comes from the money market clearing conditions. I adopt this particular normalization, which seems
more natural to me, in this paper.
Second, I make the assumption that the steady state productivity shocks are chosen to ensure that terms
of trade in steady state are equal to one, i.e. ToT =1 .Ik n o wf r o m(4.6) and (4.7) that, if the steady state
terms of trade are equal to one, then the real exchange rate is also equal to one,
RS =1 . (6.2.3)




























which implies that it is a constant fraction. Using this information about the structure of the economy and
the aggregate output equations in (3.3.36) − (3.3.37), I can re-write the steady state consumption in terms

































Naturally, it follows that these relationships are consistent with the ratio described above only if consumption




Given that the real exchange rate is equal to one, this result also follows directly from the perfect risk-
sharing condition in (3.2.29). The money supply used to normalize the price level to one in steady state is
analogously equalized, i.e. M = M
∗
.
The expressions above show that aggregate consumption in each country is proportional to the local
aggregate output. From the equilibrium labor market clearing conditions in (4.3) − (4.4),Ii m m e d i a t e l y







































































































































































































This is the most critical condition on the normalization of the steady state productivity shocks because it is
needed to guarantee that the terms of trade and the real exchange rate are both equal to one.
This normalization is very convenient to determine the basic log-linearized set of equilibrium conditions
that has become so popular in the international macro literature. However, this normalization is not in-
nocuous because it constraints the parameters of the model and may force us to rely on a fundamental
diﬀerence between the two countries. In other words, it is not always possible to assume that the steady
state productivity level in both countries is identical. So even if I normalize the steady state productivity in
the foreign country to be equal to one, I cannot make the same normalization for the domestic country. Let
me suppose that preferences are identical across countries, i.e. ξ = ξ














This means that identical preferences are not suﬃcient to restore the conventional view that the productivity




2 + n2 =
n2
1+2 n2 − 2n
. (6.2.15)
The assumption that ξ = ξ
∗ = n = 1
2 is consistent with this restriction.
Instead, let me consider the possibility that the following restriction applies on the parameters of con-
sumption bias, i.e.
(1 − n)ξ
∗ = n(1 − ξ).
T h i si st h es a m ec o n d i t i o nd e r i v e df o rt h ei r r e l e v a n c eo fa s s e tm a r k e t s .T h e n ,i ti sp o s s i b l et or e - w r i t et h e










This equation indicates that under a particular speciﬁcation of the home bias parameters it should follow
that the diﬀerences in the productivity levels in steady state are inversely related to the relative population
size of both countries. This condition is consistent with equal productivity levels, i.e. A = A∗ =1 ,i fI
assume that either n = 1
2 (equal population sizes) or ϕ =0(linear labor disutility).
Other Implications of the Normalization. Assuming this normalization of the productivity shocks
turns out to be very convenient. In the standard normalization that I propose in this paper the price level






∗ =1 , (6.2.17)
given that C = C
∗
. In a very intuitive fashion, this shows that the long-run diﬀerences in price levels across
countries can only be due to long-run diﬀerences in the money supply regime under which each country’s
monetary authority is operating. Given this simpliﬁcation of the initial condition on money supply I know
that the CPI price level must be equalized across countries, i.e. P = P
∗
.
Since the real exchange rate is equal to one given the normalization of the steady state productivity







∗ =1 . (6.2.18)
In principle the nominal exchange rate reﬂects the diﬀerent steady state values (or the initial conditions) of
the money supply. It could be said that the nominal exchange rate is a purely monetary phenomenon in the
long-run, while this is not the case in the short-run if PPP fails. However, it must be noted that this is true
under the particular normalization of the productivity shocks that I discussed before26. In any event, it is
26Another normalization in which the real exchange rate is diﬀerent than one and the consumption levels do not equalize
across countries would result in a long-run nominal exchange rate that depends on steady state money supply but also on steady
state productivity levels.
52obvious that if the monetary authority switches towards a diﬀerent regime with a diﬀerent long-run level of
money supply, the long-run CPI indexes as well as the nominal exchange rate will reﬂect the change.
Given the optimal Dixit-Stiglitz pricing rule in steady state in equations (6.1.9) − (6.1.12),t h el a b o r







































Using equations (6.2.10) − (6.2.11) to pin down the steady state levels of output, it should follow that
















































































At any rate, consumption must be identical in both countries given the conditions I impose to normalize the
steady state productivity levels. Considering that TOT =1 , the demand of each bundle of goods given by












































which is the same allocation that would prevail if I assume that the aggregator for the domestic and foreign
bundle of goods is of the Cobb-Douglas type. Given my normalization on prices, it should follow that the
steady CPI levels are,
e P (h)=P
H








based on the steady state money supply in each country.








which is equal to zero whenever,
(1 − n)ξ







53This is exactly the same condition that I derived for the irrelevance of the asset markets. This means that
the normalization proposed ensures that international trading of assets is irrelevant in steady state without
requiring that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1
γ, and the elasticity of substitution across domestic
and foreign bundles, σ, be equal to one. This normalization makes the nominal and real trade balance equal
to zero, so the allocation (in steady state at least) is not distorted by the asset availability for international
trading or lack thereof.
7 The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
From this point on, I assume that ﬁscal policy is always set at φt = φ
∗
t = −1
θ . I take as given that ﬁscal
policy eliminates the mark-up distortion, and do not discuss the subject any further27. In order to explore
the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of the diﬀerent shocks on the dynamics of the economy, the international literature
has often relied on log-linearizations. Here I do the same, I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around
the deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state. I denote b xt ≡ lnXt − lnX the deviation of a variable in logs
from its steady state. For more details on this approach, see Martínez-García (2007) and its corresponding
companion technical appendix.
7.1 Some Preliminaries
Let me start by describing the log-linearization of the domestic and foreign CPI indexes deﬁned in (3.2.13)









taking a ﬁrst-order approximation of the CPIs I derive that,
b pt ≈ ξb pH





t +( 1− ξ
∗) b pF∗
t . (7.1.2)
Id e ﬁn et h ed o m e s t i ca n df o r e i g ni n ﬂation rates in deviations as b πt ≡ b pt−b pt−1 and b π
∗
t ≡ b p∗
t−b p∗
t−1, respectively.
Id e ﬁn et h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei ne q u a t i o n(3.2.19) and describe the relative exchange prices in the home
and foreign country respectively in (3.2.20). Therefore, it immediately follows that the RS equation of the
model is equal to,
b rst = b st + b p∗
t − b pt















And, the RP equations take the form of,
b rpt = b pF











27In any case, neither the mark-up nor the ﬁscal policy terms have any impact on the short-run dynamics up to ﬁrst-order.
The mark-up and the ﬁscal policy only enter in the speciﬁcation of the long-run steady state.
54I denote world relative exchange prices, b rp
W
t ,a n dt h ed i ﬀerence between relative exchange prices across
countries, b rp
R
t , as follows,
b rp
W






t ≡ b rpt + b rp
∗
t. (7.1.7)
Hence, the RP equations in the model can also be expressed in terms of b rp
W




































t − b st − b pH∗
t
¢
+ b rpt =
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b pF








b st + b pF∗





t = −c tott, (7.1.11)
w h i c hi nt u r na l l o w sm et or e - w r i t et h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea s ,











t − c tott. (7.1.12)
These calculations show that ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate can be thought as cointegrated with
world relative exchange prices and domestic terms of trade.
7.2 The Demand-Side in the Goods Markets
The IS Equations. The linearization of the Euler equations in (3.2.30) − (3.2.31) applies to the model
under complete or incomplete asset markets and characterizes the consumption-savings decisions of the
households. This is a crucial margin of choice. I obtain the following system of two linearized Euler
equations,














which are conventionally denoted as the ISH and ISF equations, respectively. The ex ante Fisher equation
requires that the model-based implicit real interest rate be equal to,
b rt ≡ b it − Et [b πt+1], (7.2.3)
b r∗








Therefore, the expected growth rate of consumption is proportional to this measure of the real interest rate.
The constant of proportionality is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1
γ. Using the linearized CPIs
55in (7.1.1) − (7.1.2), I obtain that,




























t+1 ≡ b pH
t+1 − b pH
t and b π
F
t+1 ≡ b pF
t+1 − b pF
t .
In the literature is often preferred to express the consumption-savings margin in terms of the world IS
equation, ISW,a n dt h er e l a t i v eIS equation, ISR. These two equations represent the dynamics of world
consumption (deﬁned as a weighted average of domestic and foreign consumption), i.e. b cW
t ≡ nb ct+(1− n)b c∗
t,
and the dynamics of relative consumption, i.e. b cR
t ≡ b ct − b c∗
t. World and relative consumption are suﬃcient
to describe domestic and foreign consumption because it can be easily shown that,
b ct ≡ b cW
t +( 1− n)b cR
t , (7.2.7)
b c∗
t ≡ b cW
t − nb cR
t . (7.2.8)
These dynamics can be derived by computing n · (7.2.1) + (1 − n) · (7.2.2) and (7.2.1) − (7.2.2).T h ew o r l d















t ≡ nb it +(1− n)b i∗
t and b π
W
t+1 ≡ nb πt+1 +(1− n)b π
∗















t ≡ b it −b i∗
t and b π
R
t+1 ≡ b πt+1 − b π
∗
t+1. I interpret the argument on the right-hand side of (7.2.10) as
the diﬀerence between Fisher’s real interest rate at home and abroad.
The UIP Condition. The UIP equation, UIP, comes from the log-linearization of the intertemporal
ﬁrst-order condition in either (3.2.29) or (3.2.27) if markets are complete, and from the log-linearization of
the ﬁrst-order condition in (3.2.32) if markets are incomplete. Under complete asset markets, I obtain that
the relative consumption must be proportional to the real exchange rate, i.e.
b rst ≈ γb cR
t . (7.2.11)
Given this particular equilibrium condition, clearly equation (7.2.10) becomes somewhat redundant in the
computation of the equilibrium path. Nonetheless, equation (7.2.10) still has an interesting reading because
it implies that,














In other words, the ex ante real interest rates are equalized across countries whenever asset markets are
complete, but only if PPP holds. This, obviously, puts a constraint on the behavior of consumption on both
countries, but it also shows that violations of PPP can induce diﬀerent consumption paths across countries.
The UIP condition in its more conventional form holds up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, and it can be
56expressed as follows,
Et [∆b st+1] ≈b it −b i∗
t ≡b iR
t , (7.2.13)
where the spread in nominal interest rates reﬂects movements in the expected exchange rate. Using the
deﬁnition of the real exchange rate in (7.1.3), I can write a variant of the UIP equation in terms of the real
exchange rate as,








One way to read this is that the wedge between the real interest rate in the domestic and foreign country
is inﬂuenced by the real exchange rate, and this is true up to a ﬁrst-order approximation independently of
whether markets are complete or not. Just compare this equation with equation (7.2.12).
Another way to look at this equilibrium condition is by replacing the ex ante real interest rate diﬀerential
using equation (7.2.10), i.e.






The equation reﬂects how the risk-sharing opportunities change whenever I switch from a world from complete
markets to a world with incomplete assets markets (to a bond economy). Under complete asset markets,
the relative marginal utility of consumption across countries is equalized to the real exchange rate across all
possible states of nature, and I end up with (7.2.11). Under incomplete asset markets, the relationship only
holds in expectations because all traded bonds are uncontingent. Hence, I end up with equation (7.2.15)
instead.
Equations (7.2.11) and (7.2.15), coupled with the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate as given by (7.1.3),
are going to be crucial in the determination of the exchange rates. It is also worth noticing that this is
the only (log-linearized) equilibrium condition for which there is a diﬀerence between the incomplete asset
markets model and the complete asset markets model. In summary, the asset market structure is relevant
up to a ﬁrst-order as long as it ‘changes’ the risk-sharing opportunities available to households, so naturally
this eﬀect pops up precisely in the risk-sharing equations.
The MP Equations. A simple log-linearization of the Taylor indexes described in equations (3.4.12) −
(3.4.13) gives me the MP equations, MPH and MPF ,a s ,
b it ≈ ρb it−1 +( 1− ρ)
h
ψ1b πt + ψ2
³
b yt −b yt
´i
+ b zt, (7.2.16)
b i∗
t ≈ ρ∗b i∗




























represent the domestic and foreign output gap, respectively, b zt denotes the
domestic monetary policy shock, and b z∗
t the foreign monetary policy shock. I will derive a characterization
of the (ﬁrst-order) potential output of the economy in subsection (7.7).
Monetary policy aﬀects the demand-side of the economy because it directly ‘controls’ the nominal interest
rate. A monetary policy based on a Taylor rule can be viewed as a relationship that links the ex ante real
57interest rate to inﬂation, inﬂation expectations and the output gap, e.g.
b rt ≈ ρb rt−1 + ρ(Et−1 [b πt] − Et [b πt+1]) + (1 − ρ)
h
(ψ1 − 1)Et [b πt+1]+ψ1 (b πt − Et [b πt+1]) + ψ2
³




t ≈ ρ∗b r∗










































where Et−1 [b πt] − Et [b πt+1] can be interpreted as sensitivity to inﬂation expectation jumps. If inﬂation is
thought to be a random walk process, then inﬂation expectations can be computed as e Et [b πt+1]=b πt. Then,
b πt − Et [b πt+1] can be viewed as the forecasting error relative to the true model. This mispeciﬁcation error
can be eliminated entirely if the monetary authority targets the true inﬂation expectations, instead of just
current inﬂation.
The real interest rate has the potential to inﬂuence the consumption path of households. However, I
caution from reading too much into this line of reasoning. The reality is that every market has two sides, a
demand-side and a supply-side. The monetary authority may be able to exert some inﬂuence on the demand
(and the expenditure allocation), but the endogenous equilibrium can only be determined once I add the
supply-side of the economy. For example, let me consider an economy that is fully segregated from the rest of
the world (autarky) and where prices are ﬂexible. Without frictions, money is neutral and it has no impact
on the real output. By the market clearing conditions, however, everything that the economy produces must
be consumed by the local households (there is no capital accumulation either). The Euler equations are still
satisﬁed, but that does not mean the consumption path in equilibrium changes in response to a change in the
interest rate. In this environment, only nominal variables adjust and they do so to ensure that the resource
allocation remains unchanged. In other words, inﬂation will react to changes in the nominal interest rate to
make sure that households are satisﬁed with the consumption they already have.
The nominal exchange rate is often characterized with a combination of the UIP equation in (7.2.13) and
the MP equations described in (7.2.16) − (7.2.17). The impact of monetary policy on the determination of
the nominal exchange rate becomes easier to grasp if I make the assumption that the reaction functions of
the monetary authority are identical in both countries (i.e., ρ = ρ∗, ψ1 = ψ
∗
1,a n dψ2 = ψ
∗
2). If I combine
the UIP equation and the MP equations, it follows immediately that,
Et [∆b st+1] ≈b it −b i∗
t = ρ
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+(b zt − b z∗
t ).
(7.2.20)
Using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate from (7.1.3) and the assumption that (1 − ρ)ψ1 > 1,t h i s









































This equation is a version of the often-cited and widely-used present-value model of the nominal exchange
rate.
In very simple terms, this equation shows how the nominal exchange rate depreciates (i.e., ↑ ∆b st)i n
response to monetary policy shocks, a depreciation of the real exchange rate (i.e., ↓ ∆b rst), or a broadening
of the output gap diﬀerential across countries. The term b i∗
t−1 −b it−1 accounts for the inertia in monetary
58policy and gives past shocks an impact on current and future ﬂuctuations of the nominal rate. The monetary
authority may have an impact on the size of the output only if money has real eﬀects. However, even if that
is the case, a successful monetary policy should imply that output ﬂuctuates around its potential over time.
Therefore, if all economic agents anticipate a successful monetary policy, the contribution of the output gap
to the determination of the nominal exchange rate is likely to be ‘limited’. Therefore, it seems that the
most crucial linkage between monetary policy and the nominal exchange rate comes from the discretionary
component of monetary policy, b z∗
t − b zt,a n dt h ei n d i r e c ti n ﬂuence it may have on the real exchange rate.
I see that what matters for the determination of the nominal exchange rate is not the interest rate itself,
but the monetary shocks. That is, the unpredictable part of the policy rule. If the domestic interest rate
decreases but the policy shock is positive keeping the interest rates above what the Taylor rule prescribes,
then the nominal exchange rate appreciates (everything else equal). Otherwise it will depreciate. This is true
only if the future expectations of the monetary policy shock remain unchanged. In any event, it is perfectly
possible to rationalize a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate simultaneously with a cut in the nominal
interest rate. In this sense, I don’t think we should be surprised to ﬁnd those patterns in the data.
7.3 The Supply-Side in the Goods Markets
In the workhorse model, the Phillips curve is explicitly derived from the pricing decisions of ﬁrms. One
advantage of this approach is that the relationship has a structural interpretation, and serves to analyze the
transmission mechanism from shocks into inﬂation. The Phillips curve is no longer a mere ‘black box’ that
summarizes certain empirical regularities. But if there are structural changes in the economy, such as the
move to a low-inﬂation environment witnessed since the 1990s, the price-setting behavior of ﬁr m si sl i k e l y
to change and with it the inﬂation dynamics.
From a policy perspective, therefore, two important issues arise. First, how sensitive are the short-run
inﬂation dynamics to such shifts in the economic environment? Particularly whenever the structure of the
Phillips curve is tied to the ad hoc characterization of price stickiness proposed by Calvo (1983). Second, how
well does a Phillips curve based on the assumption of unchanged price-setting behavior of ﬁrms (including
infrequent price changes at constant rates and pricing-to-market) describe the inﬂation dynamics of an
economy thought to be in continuous evolution and adaptation to new circumstances?
The AS Equations28. The AS equations, AS
H, AS
H∗, AS
F and ASF∗,c o m ef r o mam o d e lw i t hC a l v o -
style price-setting ﬁrms and LCP pricing. The pair of equations ASH and AS
H∗ is obtained from the log
linearization of the optimal price-setting rules, equations (3.3.20) and (3.3.21),a n dt h eh o m ea n df o r e i g n
price sub-indexes of the domestic bundle, equations (3.2.16) and (3.2.17). Similarly, I derive the pair ASF and
ASF∗ from the log linearization of the foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (3.3.26) and (3.3.27),
and the price sub-indexes of the foreign bundle of goods, equations (3.2.16) and (3.2.17).
The Optimal Pricing in the Domestic Market for the Domestic Firm. I can log-linearize the
optimal pricing equation in (3.3.20) as in Martínez-García (2007). Accordingly, in steady state the Dixit-
28An important feature of the workhorse model is that while technologies are symmetric, the nominal side (pricing contracts)
and the consumption preferences are asymmetric. This shows up on the aggregate supply (or AS)e q u a t i o n s .











where the approximations are as follows,
b fH
t+τ ≡ b e pt (h) − b pH
t+τ, (7.3.2)
b gH
t+τ ≡ (b wt+τ − b pt+τ −b at+τ)+
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b e pt (h) − b pH
t+τ
´
− (b wt+τ − b pt+τ − b at+τ) −
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Notice that I can re-express the price indexes b pH
t+τ and b pH∗
t+τ respectively as b pH












t+i. Hence, the optimal pricing equation becomes,
b e pt (h) − b pH









b wt+τ − b pH
t+τ − b at+τ
¢io
. (7.3.5)
In other words, the diﬀerence between the price charged by a ﬁrm that can reset prices and the average
price of all the ﬁrms who cannot re-optimize is given by a weighted function of current and future inﬂation
expectations and the marginal costs.
The nominal marginal cost net of (constant) labor subsidies from (3.3.3) can be expressed as,
c mct ≡ (b wt − b at), (7.3.6)
c mc
∗
t ≡ (b w∗
t −b a∗
t). (7.3.7)





























Therefore, the optimal pricing equation can be generically written as,
















which is clearly a function of current and future marginal costs. I can easily re-write the above expression
under rational expectations as follows,
b e pt (h) − b pH
t−1 ≈ b π
H
t +( 1− βα)
¡









Equation (7.3.9) is the forward-looking (no-bubbles) solution to this equation.
60The Optimal Pricing in the Foreign Market for the Domestic Firm. In steady state the Dixit-











where the approximations are as follows,
b fH∗
t+τ ≡ b e p
∗
t (h) − b pH∗
t+τ +
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b st+τ + b pH∗
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Notice that I can re-express the price indexes b pH
t+τ and b pH∗
t+τ respectively as b pH












t+i. Hence, the optimal pricing equation becomes,
b e p
∗
t (h) − b pH∗









b wt+τ − b pH∗
t+τ − b st+τ −b at+τ
¢io
. (7.3.15)
In other words, the diﬀerence between the price charged by a ﬁrm that can reset prices and the average price
of all the local ﬁrms that cannot re-optimize is given by a weighted function of current and future inﬂation
expectations and the marginal costs.
The nominal marginal cost net of (constant) labor subsidies from (3.3.3) can be expressed as,
c mct ≡ (b wt − b at), (7.3.16)
c mc
∗
t ≡ (b w∗
t −b a∗
t). (7.3.17)






























Therefore, the optimal pricing equation can be generically written as,
b e p
∗












c mct+τ − b pH∗
t+τ − b st+τ
¢i
, (7.3.19)
which is clearly a function of current and future marginal costs. I can easily re-write the above expression
under rational expectations as follows,
b e p
∗
t (h) − b pH∗
t−1 ≈ b π
H∗
t +( 1− βα)
¡
c mct − b pH∗










Equation (7.3.19) is the forward-looking (no-bubbles) solution to this equation.
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where the approximations are as follows,
b fF
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Notice that I can re-express the price indexes b pF
t+τ and b pF∗
t+τ respectively as b pF












t+i. Hence, the optimal pricing equation becomes,
b e pt (f) − b pF










t+τ − b pF




In other words, the diﬀerence between the price charged by a ﬁrm that can reset prices and the average
price of all the local ﬁrms that cannot reset their prices is given by a weighted function of current and future
inﬂation expectations and the marginal costs.
The nominal marginal cost net of (constant) labor subsidies from (3.3.3) can be expressed as,
c mct ≡ (b wt − b at), (7.3.26)
c mc
∗
t ≡ (b w∗
t −b a∗
t). (7.3.27)






























Therefore, the optimal pricing equation can be generically written as,














t+τ − b pF
t+τ + b st+τ
¢i
, (7.3.29)
which is clearly a function of current and future marginal costs. I can easily re-write the above expression
under rational expectations as follows,
b e pt (f) − b pF
t−1 ≈ b π
F




t − b pF








Equation (7.3.29) is the forward-looking (no-bubbles) solution to this equation.
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where the approximations are as follows,
b fF
t+τ ≡ b e p
∗










































Notice that I can re-express the price indexes b pF
t+τ and b pF∗
t+τ respectively as b pF












t+i. Hence, the optimal pricing equation becomes,
b e p
∗
t (f) − b pF∗















In other words, the diﬀerence between the price charged by a ﬁrm that can reset prices and the average
price of all the local ﬁrms who cannot reset their prices is given by a weighted function of current and future
inﬂation expectations and the marginal costs.
The nominal marginal cost net of (constant) labor subsidies from (3.3.3) can be expressed as,
c mct ≡ (b wt − b at), (7.3.36)
c mc
∗
t ≡ (b w∗
t −b a∗
t). (7.3.37)






























Therefore, the optimal pricing equation can be generically written as,
b e p
∗


















which is clearly a function of current and future marginal costs. I can easily re-write the above expression
under rational expectations as follows,
b e p
∗
t (f) − b pF∗
t−1 ≈ b π
F∗















Equation (7.3.39) is the forward-looking (no-bubbles) solution to this equation.
63The Price Sub-Indexes of Home and Foreign Bundles. In a symmetric equilibrium under sticky

























































which accounts for the fact that a proportion of ﬁrms maintain their prices while the remaining ﬁrms re-
optimize. The re-optimizing ﬁrms also use a symmetric pricing rule. In a zero-inﬂation steady state, it must
hold that P
H










(f). Hence, the log-linear approximation
of these price sub-indexes becomes simply,
b pH
t ≈ αb pH
t−1 +( 1− α)b e pt (h), (7.3.45)
b pH∗
t ≈ αb pH∗




t ≈ α∗b pF
t−1 +( 1− α∗)b e pt (f), (7.3.47)
b pF∗
t ≈ α∗b pF∗
t−1 +( 1− α∗)b e p
∗
t (f). (7.3.48)
A straightforward manipulation of these equations tells me that the diﬀerence between the optimal pricing
rules, b e pt (h) and b e p
∗
t (h), and the price sub-indexes, b pH
t and b pH∗
t , is proportional to the inﬂation rate in logs,
i.e. h

























Similarly, the diﬀerence between the optimal pricing rule, b e pt (f) and b e p
∗
t (f), and the price sub-indexes, b pF
t
and b pF∗
t , is proportional to the inﬂation rate in logs, i.e.
h

























The Aggregate-Supply Equations for the Domestic Firm: ASH and ASH∗ The aggregate supply
equations can be derived from the optimal pricing rules in (7.3.10) and (7.3.20), and the aggregation rules
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t +( 1− βα)
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t ≈ b π
H∗
t +( 1− βα)
¡
c mct − b pH∗
























(1 − α)(1− βα)
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(1 − α)(1− βα)
α
¡
c mct − b pH∗
t − b st
¢
. (7.3.54)
These equations are central in my derivations of the Phillips curve for both economies.
The Aggregate-Supply Equations for the Foreign Firm: ASF and ASF∗ The aggregate supply
equations can be derived from the optimal pricing rules in (7.3.30),a n d(7.3.40), and the aggregation rules
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These equations are central in my derivations of the Phillips curve for both economies too.

























It follows from the two domestic aggregate supply curves in (7.3.53) and (7.3.54) that,
b π
F





















In either case the structure of the pricing equations is such that marginal cost (whatever that might be)
completely drops out of the equation. This explains why pricing diﬀerences in the workhorse international
macro model are closely linked to the nominal exchange rate, and why the standard model has such a hard
time explaining the low degree of pass-through found in the data.
The Aggregate AS Equations: The Inﬂation Dynamics. The inﬂation dynamics in the domestic
country can be derived by applying the aggregation rule in (7.1.1) to equations (7.3.53) and (7.3.57).S i m p l e
algebra gives me the following expression,
b πt ≈ βEt (b πt+1)+








(1 − α∗)(1− βα∗)




t − b pF
t + b st
¢
. (7.3.61)
65Whenever the Calvo contracts are symmetric across countries, i.e. α = α∗, it follows that the inﬂation
dynamics take a more conventional form,
b πt ≈ βEt (b πt+1)+
(1 − α)(1− βα)
α
£
ξ c mct +( 1− ξ) c mc
∗
t − b pt +( 1− ξ)b st
¤
. (7.3.62)
This shows that the direct eﬀect on inﬂation from ﬂuctuations of the nominal exchange rate depends on the
proportion of foreign goods in the domestic consumption basket, ξ, as well as the degree of price stickiness,
α, and the subjective discount factor, β.
The inﬂation dynamics in the foreign country can be derived by applying the aggregation rule in (7.1.2)
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Whenever the Calvo contracts are symmetric across countries, i.e. α = α∗, it follows that the inﬂation














∗ c mct +( 1− ξ
∗) c mc
∗





This shows that the direct eﬀect on inﬂation from ﬂuctuations of the nominal exchange rate depends on the
proportion of domestic goods in the foreign consumption basket, ξ
∗, as well as the degree of price stickiness,
α, and the subjective discount factor, β.
7.4 The Labor Market Equilibrium Conditions and Marginal Costs
The LM Equations. The LM equations, LM H and LM F, are easily derived from the ﬁrst-order conditions
of the household’s problem in (3.2.38)−(3.2.39), the labor market clearing conditions in (3.3.12)−(3.3.13),
and the linear-in-labor technologies in (3.3.1)−(3.3.2). Log-linearizing the labor supply functions in (3.2.38)−
(3.2.39) it follows that,
b wt − b pt ≈ γb ct + ϕb ls
t, (7.4.1)
b w∗
t − b p∗
t ≈ γb c∗
t + ϕb ls∗
t . (7.4.2)
The combination of the labor market clearing conditions and the linear-in-labor technologies in (3.3.28) −
(3.3.29) (or in (3.3.12) − (3.3.13) and (3.3.1) − (3.3.2)) can be used to derive that,
b yt ≈ b at +b ls
t, (7.4.3)
b y∗
t ≈ b a∗
t +b ls∗
t . (7.4.4)
Naturally, putting all these results together helps me characterize the path of real wages both in the domestic
and foreign country. It follows that,
b wt − b pt ≈ γb ct + ϕb yt − ϕb at, (7.4.5)
b w∗
t − b p∗
t ≈ γb c∗
t + ϕb y∗
t − ϕb a∗
t. (7.4.6)
66These are the LM H and LM F equations of the model, and they are both instrumental in the determination
of the marginal costs faced by ﬁrms in the economy.
The Y Equations. The output equations, Y H and Y F, are easily derived from the aggregate goods mar-
ket clearing conditions in (3.3.32)−(3.3.33). Almost mechanically, the aggregate market clearing conditions


























































































































Let me point out that the relative price dispersion has no ﬁrst-order impact on the production in either



























t (f) − b pF∗
t
¢
df =0 . (7.4.9)
Therefore, I can re-write the domestic and foreign output as follows,


























































1−n ).N o t i c et h a tη = η∗ = n whenever ξ = ξ
∗, while
η = ξ and η∗ = ξ
∗ if (1 − n)ξ
∗ = n(1 − ξ). Per capita output can also be conveniently re-written if I use
the log-linearization of the CPI in (7.1.1) and (7.1.2) as30,





t − b pF
t
¢




t − b pF∗
t
¢¤














t − b pF∗
t
¢¤
+[ η∗b ct +( 1− η∗)b c∗
t], (7.4.13)
or, based on the log-linearization of the deﬁnition of relative exchange prices,
b yt ≈ σ [η(1 − ξ) b rpt − (1 − η)(1− ξ
∗) b rp
∗
t]+[ ηb ct +( 1− η)b c∗
t], (7.4.14)
b y∗
t ≈ σ [−η∗ξ b rpt +( 1− η∗)ξ
∗ b rp
∗
t]+[ η∗b ct +( 1− η∗)b c∗
t], (7.4.15)
29The log-linearization is attained based on the normalization of the steady state that I discussed before in subsection 6.1.
30It is necessary to check that these formulas are consistent with the approximation of the market clearing condition in
(3.5.19). I do not check this consistency condition here, but I will discuss it later in the paper where it applies to the frictionless
economy (subsection 7.7).
67where
b rpt = b pF











The Y H and Y F equations of the model are also instrumental in the determination of the marginal costs
faced by ﬁrms in the economy.
The dispersion in relative prices that aﬀects the output levels supplied by each ﬁrm is of second-order
importance as noted in my comments before. Indeed, this claim has become part of the jargon used in the
literature. I think, however, that it is a somewhat misleading statement based on partial analysis. It does
not take into account the endogeneity of the right-hand side variables and the general equilibrium eﬀects of
price stickiness that pop-up (even for a ﬁrst-order approximation) from a fully-speciﬁed DSGE model. In the
workhorse model, this is quite easy to understand. After all, price stickiness still has a ﬁrst-order impact on
the pricing decision of ﬁrms and, therefore, alters both the path of inﬂation and output in this economy. The
impact of price stickiness on the short-run dynamics of output is non-trivial, and can be measured relative
to the frictionless allocation by the size of the output gap!
The Marginal Costs. The combination of the LM and Y equations allows me to characterize the marginal
cost functions that are relevant for the pricing decisions of ﬁrms and for the dynamics of inﬂation. If I put
all these equations together, I can re-write the nominal marginal costs as follows,
c mct − b pH
t ≡ (b wt − b at) − b pH
t

























t − b pF∗
t ≡ (b w∗
t − b a∗
t) − b pF∗
t
≈ γb c∗



















− (1 + ϕ)b a∗
t + b p∗
t − b pF∗
t ,
(7.4.17)
Alternatively, using the log-linearization of the deﬁnition of relative exchange prices, I can re-label the
marginal cost functions as follows,
c mct − b pH
t ≈ γb ct + ϕb yt +( 1− ξ) b rpt − (1 + ϕ)b at
≈ γb ct + ϕσ [η(1 − ξ) b rpt − (1 − η)(1− ξ
∗) b rp
∗
t]+ϕ[ηb ct +( 1− η)b c∗
t]+( 1− ξ) b rpt − (1 + ϕ)b at, (7.4.18)
c mc
∗
t − b pF∗
t ≈ γb c∗




t − (1 + ϕ)b a∗
t
≈ γb c∗
t + ϕσ [−η∗ξ b rpt +( 1− η∗)ξ
∗ b rp
∗




t − (1 + ϕ)b a∗
t. (7.4.19)
68Based on this equation, it clearly follows that the marginal cost is a function of relative exchange prices and
aggregate consumption. More generally, I can infer that,
c mct − b pH
t ≈ γb ct + ϕ[ηb ct +( 1− η)b c∗
t]+ϕσ[η(1 − ξ) b rpt − (1 − η)(1− ξ
∗) b rp
∗
t]+( 1− ξ) b rpt−
− (1 + ϕ)b at,
(7.4.20)
c mct − b pH∗
t − b st ≈ γb ct + ϕ[ηb ct +( 1− η)b c∗
t]+ϕσ [η(1 − ξ) b rpt − (1 − η)(1− ξ
∗) b rp
∗
t]+c tott − ξ b rpt−
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− (1 + ϕ)b a∗
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(7.4.23)
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t − (1 + ϕ)b a
#
. (7.4.27)
This system of four equations suﬃces to characterizes the dynamics of inﬂation in both the domestic and
foreign economies when combined with the log-linearized CPI indexes in (7.1.1) and (7.1.2). The structure
of these equations is the same independently of whether the asset markets are complete or incomplete in the
model.
7.5 The Equilibrium Trade Balance
The TB Equation. The real trade balance equation, TB, comes from the log-linearization of equation
(3.5.38) by parts, which holds whether asset markets are complete or incomplete. What I do is I log-linearize
nPPI t
Pt Yt and nCt,a n dId e ﬁne the log-linear approximation of the real trade balance as the diﬀerence. Then,
it follows immediately that,
b tbt − b pt ≡
ξ∗(1−n)






















t ≡ b ct − b c∗
t. I use the normalization of the steady state discussed in subsection 6.1, which implies
that (1 − n)ξ
∗ = n(1 − ξ) ensures a zero trade balance in steady state, in order to simplify the equation
69above as,










t − b p∗
t
¢¢
− (1 − ξ)b cR
t . (7.5.2)
Finally, if I use the log-linearization of the CPI in (7.1.1) and (7.1.2), I am able to write the trade balance
more compactly as,
b tbt − b pt ≡ (1 − η) b rst +( σ − 1)(η(1 − ξ) b rpt − (1 − η)(1− ξ
∗) b rp
∗
t) − (1 − η)b cR
t , (7.5.3)








n ) and the relative exchange prices are deﬁned as,
b rpt = b pF











In this equation, b tbt measures the per capita nominal trade balance, and b rp
W




tracks the world relative exchange prices31.
It also shows that the trade balance expressed in real terms (in units of the domestic consumption basket
of goods) depends on consumption in both countries as well as on changes in the real exchange rate and
world relative exchange prices. If PPP holds, then expenditure switching across countries comes exclusively
from ﬂuctuations of the world relative exchange prices. If PPP does not hold, then, expenditure switching
will no longer depend on the world relative exchange prices alone.
7.6 The Money Market Equilibrium Conditions
The MM Equations. The MM equations, MM H and MM F, are easily derived from the money-market
clearing conditions in (3.4.8) − (3.4.9). Log-linearizing these equations it follows that32,


























The equations say that the real balances are cointegrated with the nominal interest rate and with aggregate
consumption (instead of aggregate output as in Cagan’s money demand functions). Taking the diﬀerence
between (7.6.1) and (7.6.2) and using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate is easy to derive an expression
for the nominal interest rate spread across both countries as,
















t > 0, then foreign-produced goods are relatively more expensive and world demand is shifted towards
home-produced goods.
32The approximation is calculated relative to gross interest rates, not relative to net interest rates.
70where b cR
t ≡ b ct − b c∗
t, b mR
t ≡ b mt − b m∗
t,a n db pR
t ≡ b pt − b p∗

















t ≡b it −b i∗
t. In words, this tells me that the interest rate diﬀerential is negatively proportional to the
money supply diﬀerential, and positively proportional to the relative consumption and to the relative CPIs
across countries.
7.7 The Frictionless Allocation for Potential Output
The labor market equilibrium conditions of the frictionless allocation in equations (4.3) and (4.4) can be
easily log-linearized as,
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Similarly, the perfect international risk-sharing condition under complete asset markets described in equation




b rst +b c
∗
t. (7.7.3)
Re-labelling equation (7.1.3) I can express the log-linearized real exchange rate as,



















while the relevant deﬁnitions of terms of trade that apply to the frictionless model are c tott ≡ b p
F





t ≡ b p
H∗
t − b p
F∗
t = −c tott. The assumption of the frictionless model is that prices are fully ﬂexible, so the
LOOP holds at the variety level and, due to symmetry, also at the level of locally-produced bundles of goods.
Hence, manipulating equation (7.1.3) I can re-write the log-linearized real exchange rate as a function of the
terms of trade,
b rst ≡ b p
∗
t +b st −b pt









=( ξ − ξ
∗) c tott. (7.7.5)
In other words, up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the real exchange rate is unaﬀected by the elasticity of
substitution across bundles, but depends upon the assumption of home bias in consumption.
Given that the LOOP holds under ﬂexible prices (see equations (3.3.14) − (3.3.15)), it is possible to
re-write the output equations for both countries as in (3.3.36) − (3.3.37). After re-labelling those equations
to take account of the fact that I am referring to the frictionless allocation, I log-linearize them around the
71normalized steady state to obtain that,






































1−n ). It must be noted, once again, that the condition
on the home bias parameters applied for the irrelevance of asset markets, i.e. n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ
∗, implies
here that η ≡ ξ and η∗ ≡ ξ
∗. Taking the diﬀerence between the output level in both countries, I can say
that,
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Using the terms of trade and the real exchange rate deﬁnitions, then recalling that under ﬂexible prices the
LOOP holds (and b p
F∗
t −b st = b p
F
t ), I can re-write the diﬀerence above as,
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which indicates that both relative prices are proportional to the output diﬀerential across countries.











































where these formulas depend on the home bias parameters but also on a weighted average of the elasticity of
substitution across bundles of goods, σ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1
γ. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, however, only plays a role in determining the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to
the output diﬀerential whenever I assume home bias in consumption, i.e. ξ 6= ξ
∗. Based on the structure of
33These calculations do not depend on the assumptions I made regarding the technology used in this economy. Therefore,
the same kind of relationships should hold also if I had a production techology that uses other inputs rather than labor alone,
specially capital.




























are also related to terms of trade.
Then, I combine all these results in order to write domestic and foreign output as,
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Using one more time the perfect risk-sharing condition derived in (7.7.3), I can re-write the domestic and









































ξ−ξ∗ +( 1− η)
´
− 1






+ σ(1 − (η − η∗)) + 1






















ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1








ξ−ξ∗ +( 1− η)
´
− 1




ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1
























+ σ (1 − (η − η∗)) + 1





















ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1















ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1





73Assuming that n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ
∗, the equations can be further simpliﬁed as,
b ct ≈ b yt −
⎡
⎣
σ(1 − ξ)(1+(ξ − ξ
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which tells me that the consumption in each country is a weighted function of the output produced in both
countries (weighted according to household’s preferences).
Consistency with the Market Clearing Conditions. I know that the sum of the real aggregate output
in both countries equals the sum of the real aggregate consumption which follows from the market clearing
conditions in (3.5.19). Hence, after log-linearizing it must follow that,








nY +( 1− n)Y
∗ (1 − n)b y
∗
t, (7.7.26)








































































The steady state normalization, applied to any choice of the consumption bias parameters, requires that,

















































































As a result I can express the market clearing condition becomes,
nb ct +( 1− n)b c
∗
t ≈
η∗ (1 − n)ξ
η∗ (1 − n)ξ + ηn(1 − ξ)
b yt +
ηn(1 − ξ)




I impose on the home bias parameters that n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ
∗, which further implies that η ≡ ξ and
η∗ ≡ ξ













so nY =( 1− n)Y
∗
, and it holds true that,











If I aggregate equations (7.7.22) and (7.7.23) accordingly, it shall follow that,
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Hence, this implies that in order for the approximation to be consistent with the market clearing condition,
the elasticity of substitution across bundles of domestic and foreign goods, σ, and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, 1











ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1
γ (η − η∗)
=
η∗ (1 − n)ξ





ξ−ξ∗ +( 1− η)
´
+ 1




ξ−ξ∗ − (η − η∗)
´
+ 1
γ (η − η∗)
=
ηn(1 − ξ)
η∗ (1 − n)ξ + ηn(1 − ξ)
. (7.7.29)
Since there are two restrictions and two degrees of freedom, the parameters σ and γ, it could happen that
either no solution exists, that only a solution exists that functionally relates these two elasticities to the
home bias parameters, or that these equations are satisﬁed for any possible choice of the elasticities. I check
here only the conditions applying to the special case where n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ
∗. Given this parametric








γ (n(1 − ξ


















ξ−ξ∗ +( 1− ξ)
´
+ 1



























































ξ−ξ∗ +( 1− ξ)
´
+( 1− n) 1































































































where I use once again the fact that n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ
∗.
In general, this implies that for internal consistency with the market clearing condition, I cannot pick an
arbitrary choice for the two elasticities. At the same time, I can also show that if I choose both countries to
be symmetric in size, i.e. n = 1
2, then the left- and the right-hand side terms of this restriction become zero
and that allows me an unrestricted selection of both elasticities. Making both countries symmetric was also
a necessary condition in the standard normalization to be able to assume that the steady state productivity
levels in both countries are identical and equal to one.
The Potential Output of the Economy. Mindful of the implicit restriction on the elasticity of sub-
stitution across bundles of domestic and foreign goods, σ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
1
γ, I proceed ahead to derive the implicit relationship between output and productivity shocks. For that, I
only have to replace consumption, prices and terms of trade in the log-linearized equilibrium labor market
clearing conditions derived in (7.7.1) − (7.7.2) to easily obtain the following system of two equations in two
76unknowns,




























































































































t ≈ (1 + ϕ)b a∗
t.
(7.7.34)
The solution to this system of equations gives me the following pair of formulas,
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These two equations characterize the potential output of the economy, and implicitly set a reference for the
output gap targeted by the monetary authorities.
Let me assume that the usual restriction is imposed on the home bias parameters, i.e. n(1 − ξ)=
77(1 − n)ξ
∗. Then, operating on (7.7.1) − (7.7.2), I can obtain the following system of equations,




































































































t ≈ (1 + ϕ)b a∗
t.
(7.7.38)
The solution to this system of equations gives me the following pair of formulas,














































































Using the structure of the linear-in-labor technology functions, it is possible to approximate aggregate output
as,
b yt ≈ b lt + b at,
b y
∗
t ≈ b l
∗
t + b a∗
t,
therefore, the equilibrium level of employment follows easily from here.
78I already argued, while discussing the irrelevance of asset markets, that under certain special conditions34
the foreign shocks have no direct impact on the domestic output. That was true because under those
conditions the nominal trade balance was equal to zero. However, in my previous calculations appears
an interesting fact which is true independently of the choice of home bias parameters. If the elasticity of






then local employment and output will only depend on local productivity shocks up to a ﬁrst-order approxi-
mation. Arguably, this is a knife-edge case. However, these two parameters have very important implications
for the way labor reacts to shocks coming from abroad. In fact, it can be said that these two parameters
regulate whether the wealth eﬀects or the substitution eﬀects dominate on the employment decisions (and,






determines the sign of λa∗ and λ
∗
a.
The Output Gap and Monetary Policy. If monetary policy targets deviations of output from its
potential, as posited by the Taylor rule, it can no longer ignore the foreign productivity shocks except
whenever σ = 1
γ. My previous derivations show that potential output in either country is a function of both
productivity shocks. On one hand, it indicates that potential output can be aﬀected by the productivity
shock of the other country (if international trade in goods is feasible). On the other hand, it shows that the
monetary authority has no inﬂuence whatsoever on potential output. This should not be surprising since the
potential output of the economy is the output that would prevail in a frictionless economy, which is precisely
t h et y p eo fe c o n o m yw h e r em o n e yi sn e u t r a l .
The Taylor monetary policy rules also suggest that errors in the estimation of potential output could
b ep e r c e i v e do rm i s i n t e r p r e t e da sm o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k s ,w h i l ei nr e a l i t yt h e ya r et r u l ys u p p l y( o rr e a l )
shocks. For example, let me suppose that the domestic monetary authority believes the economy to be
closed or the foreign productivity shocks to be unimportant and estimates the domestic potential output as
b yt ≈ λab at. Depending on the sign of λa and the realization of the foreign shock, the output gap may be
either overestimated or underestimated by the monetary authority. That means the interest rates might be
either too high or too low relative to what the correctly-speciﬁed Taylor rule would prescribe in order to
drive the economy closer to the frictionless allocation. Hence, this speciﬁcation error can be detrimental for
the goals of the policy-maker.
Let me suppose now, as an alternative example, that the monetary authority follows the Taylor rules
prescribed in (7.2.16)−(7.2.17). But an econometrician does not know how to correctly estimate the potential
output that is being targeted. Then, the diﬀerences between the econometrician’s conjecture and the true
output gap of the economy will be interpreted as monetary policy shocks. While, in fact, these speciﬁcation
errors should be functionally related to productivity shocks, because potential output only depends on real
shocks. Because these output gap errors are misconstrued as monetary policy shocks, econometrician’s may
use them to conclude that monetary policy shocks are correlated with real shocks, even though that is not
the case. These errors could also lead the econometrician to conclude that Taylor rules have real eﬀects,
34That is, whenever σ = γ =1 , n(1 − ξ)=( 1− n)ξ∗ and the net debt in the initial conditions is zero.
79even when there is little truth to that (if anything at all).
7.8 The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions: Revisited
The workhorse model is build around a log-linearized set of equilibrium conditions. It has been shown that
asset prices, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate particularly, can be pin down with the
current framework. Moreover, this ﬁrst-order approximation is suﬃcient to close the model and determine
the relevant allocations based on a small number of Euler equations, pricing equations and asset pricing
equations. For instance, I derive aggregate output and consumption, inﬂation, as well as the trade balance
based on these equations only.
However, the portfolio allocation is indeterminate up to a ﬁrst-order approximation. The composition
of assets in each country’s portfolio cannot be determined in this way. One way to attain a determinate
portfolio allocation would be to produce a second-order approximation of the asset pricing equations. This
is precisely the approach that Evans and Hnatkovska (2005, 2007) follow. Portfolio determination is crucial
f o ro u rm a c r om o d e l st ob ea b l et os a ys o m e t h i n gi n t e r e s t i n go nt h ehome bias in equity portfolios puzzle or
regarding the role of ﬁnancial globalization.
However, it seems important to emphasize that asset prices, not portfolio quantities, is all that is needed
to determine the allocations (even the trade balance) in the workhorse model. On one hand, portfolio
allocations are only of second-order importance to help us understand the behavior of the economy. On the
other hand, the asset market structure is quite important still in as much as determines the risk-sharing
opportunities available and, therefore, the eﬃciency with which households pool their risks and trade.
What does this mean for monetary policy? The asset market structure inﬂuences decisively the risk-
sharing that occurs across countries. Therefore, it changes the ﬁnancial environment in which monetary
policy is conducted and through which it is implemented. It also introduces a potential role for monetary
policy to promote better risk pooling across countries (insurance), which is not clear whether it conﬂicts or
not with the objective of price stability. I argue that portfolio allocations are of second-order importance for
the determination of those variables (primarily inﬂation and output/consumption) that are thought to be of
relevance for the monetary authority. Up to a ﬁrst-order eﬀect, only certain asset prices like the short-term
nominal rates, the consumption-saving decision of households and the pricing decisions of ﬁrms matter in the
context of the workhorse model. Nonetheless, the asset market structure cannot be ignored by policy-makers
as exempliﬁed by the distinction between a complete asset markets economy and a ‘bond economy’ in this
paper.
F i n a l l y ,i ti sw o r t ha l w a y sk e e p i n ga no p e nm i n do nt h e s et o p i c sa n dﬁnancial globalization is no exception.
In a slightly more complex model with borrowing constraints, diﬀerential trading costs across asset types or
segmented markets and diﬀerent degrees of asset substitutability, the claim that portfolio allocations are of
second-order importance may no longer be true. Certainly, more research needs to be done along these lines.
808C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
First, monetary policy is neutral if prices are ﬂexible, ﬁrms are competitive and asset markets are complete.
In this context, it makes little sense for the monetary authority to worry about output ﬂuctuations over
t h eb u s i n e s sc y c l eb e c a u s ei ti so u t s i d et h es e to ft h ings monetary policy can actually accomplish. In the
presence of nominal rigidities in the goods markets (and possibly other frictions), monetary policy may have
real eﬀects because the price level can be manipulated to alter some relative prices. Monetary policy can
play a role in dampening the relative price distortions implied by these frictions. However, even if monetary
policy was fully eﬀective in eliminating these distortions, its real eﬀects may only be modest.
After controlling for other sources of heterogeneity across ﬁrms, large real distortions depend on the
existence of very large relative price diﬀerences. In Calvo’s (1983) world with nominal rigidities, these
relative price disparities are only possible if inﬂation is quite sizeable. But it is unlikely that ﬁrms will make
their pricing decisions only sporadically if inﬂation is pushing the relative prices rapidly far apart. The ﬁrms
being hurt by the resulting misallocation of spending would endogenously re-price their goods (and will do
so frequently) to mitigate the decline in the expenditure share they get. Therefore, this should keep relative
price diﬀerences ‘contained’. That’s what logic dictates. Therefore, I should not anticipate a very large real
eﬀects. If large relative price diﬀerences do exist, that may have to be explained by some other feature that
this simple model of sticky price contracts cannot either capture or approximate sensibly.
Second, independently of the magnitude of the real eﬀects of monetary policy, one of the underlying
themes of this paper is how to conduct monetary policy in this environment with nominal rigidities. I would
argue that, at least conceptually, the Taylor-type policy rule should be ‘robust’ to model uncertainty. If
you believe that the frictionless model best describes the economy, then you must believe that output is
most of the time at its ‘potential’. Therefore, on the basis of a simple Taylor rule, you should set the short-
term interest rate to determine the inﬂation rate. Monetary policy only aﬀects nominal variables, and the
objective of price stability seems a perfectly reasonable criteria. If you believe that nominal rigidities (or
other frictions) are pushing the economy away from its potential, then a Taylor rule has real eﬀects and can
be used to force the economy to revert back to the frictionless allocation. Inﬂation targeting ensures that
relative price distortions are minimized and, in doing so, it ‘reduces’ the welfare loss for consumers.
Third, price stability is the ultimate goal of the monetary authority whether you believe that money is
neutral or not. The discrepancy in the implementation of the Taylor policy rule arises because economists
do not seem to agree on the potential output of the economy (even if they agree to adopt exactly the same
policy rule). Conventional measures of output gap make critical assumptions on what potential output is
likely to be. However, it is not necessarily obvious that observable output is not equal (or closely matches)
the potential output. This is where model uncertainty becomes a contentious issue, and this is why most of
the policy debate seems to move these days around the challenge of how to best estimate the output gap.
Finally, as I have shown in this paper, inﬂation and prices are an essentially monetary phenomenon.
But even in the frictionless economy, where I have analytical solutions, it is clear that consumption prices
are inﬂuenced by monetary shocks. However, it is also obvious that consumption prices are aﬀected by
other shocks to the economy (including productivity shocks). It is necessary to dispel the myth that lower
inﬂation and more stable prices necessarily implies that monetary policy has become ‘better’ or ‘tighter’. It
is perfectly possible to be running a loose monetary policy while (either domestic or foreign) productivity
shocks are pushing inﬂation down. In fact, that might even be the correct policy prescription at the time to
81maintain price stability without the perils of deﬂation. In other words, inﬂation reﬂects more than just the
impact of monetary shocks.
The problem with a situation like this is that the monetary authorities may ‘get accustomed’ to run a
loose monetary policy. Then, it may be costly to re-set monetary policy towards a tighter phase whenever
the inﬂation downward bias caused by productivity shocks wanes down or disappears. We may keep running
a loose monetary policy for too long and, hence, end up feeding the inﬂation ‘monster’ in the process.
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87A The Nonlinear Dynamics
A.1 The Flexible Price, Complete Asset Markets Model


























































































The Supply-Side in the Goods Market:
ASH P
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, if σ =1 ,






Other Auxiliary Equilibrium Conditions:

























































































































































































88A.2 The Sticky Price, Complete Asset Markets Model
















































































T h eS u p p l y - S i d ei nt h eG o o d sM a r k e t :
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89A.3 The Sticky Price, Incomplete Asset Markets Model
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Other Auxiliary Equilibrium Conditions:














































































































































































90B The Deterministic Steady State

























ω∈Ω Q(ω) =1 ,























The Supply-Side in the Goods Market:
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91C The Log-Linearized Dynamics (A First-Order Approximation)
C.1 The Flexible Price, Complete Asset Markets Model
Potential Output:











LH b lt ≈ b yt − b at,
LH∗ b l
∗
t ≈ b y
∗
t − b a∗
t,
Potential Consumption:











































Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade:












































































































92C.2 The Sticky Price, Complete Asset Markets Model
The Demand-Side in the Goods Market:
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Other Auxiliary Equilibrium Conditions:
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93C.3 The Sticky Price, Incomplete Asset Markets Model
The Demand-Side in the Goods Market:
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